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The challenge of multiculturalism: global changes and Australian
experiences
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the experience of Australia with regard to immigration and migrant
settlement since 1945, and to discuss the model of multiculturalism which has emerged as a way of shaping
social policy and national identity in an increasingly diverse society. Australia is widely regarded as a 'classical
country of immigration'. Indeed, apart from Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders who make up
approximately 2 per cent of the population, the whole Australian people can trace their origins back to the
immigrations which started with British colonization in 1788. Immigration has always been a central part of
nation-building in Australia. Since 1945, there has been a planned program of mass immigration. Today, one
in five Australians are immigrants or children of immigrants, and the country is one of the most ethnically
diverse in the world.
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The aim of this paper is to examine the experience of Australia with regard to 
immigration and migrant settlement since 1945, and to discuss the model of 
multiculturalism which has emerged as a way of shaping social policy and 
national identity in an increasingly diverse society. Australia is widely regarded 
as a 'classical country of immigration'. Indeed, apart from Aborigines and Torres 
Strait Islanders who make up approximately 2 per cent of the population, the 
whole Australian people can trace their origins back to the immigrations which 
started with British colonization in 1788. Immigration has always been a central 
part of nation-building in Australia. Since 1945, there has been a planned program 
of mass immigration. Today, one in five Australians are immigrants or children of 
immigrants, and the country is one of the most ethnically diverse in the world.
Migration to Australia
After 1788, the Australian colonies developed as a white settler society, closely 
linked to Britain, and integrated into the economic system of the Empire. The 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population was partially destroyed, 
dispossessed and socially marginalized. A new population, both of convict or free 
origin, was brought in with a high measure of state planning and control. Ever since 
1788, governments (initially the British colonial administration, later the 
Australian federal and state governments) have recruited, subsidized or encouraged 
immigrants, have made efforts to select suitable entrants, and have provided 
various special services for settlers (DIEA, 1986). This tradition of state 
intervention makes immigration a central area of public policy.
Prior to the Second World War, the overwhelming majority of settlers came from 
Britain. European minority groups such as the Irish, Germans and Italians often 
encountered hostility and discrimination (de Lepervanche, 1975). But racism was 
strongest against non-European immigrants, particularly the Chinese, who came in
response to the Gold Rushes of the 1850s, and South Pacific Islanders, recruited as 
cheap labour by plantation owners in the late 19th century. There was a close link 
between racism and the emerging feeling of Australian nationhood (MacQueen, 
1975). The 'yellow peril' of Asian invasion was a persistent image of Australian 
popular culture. One of the first laws passed by the new Federal Parliament in 1901 
was the Immigration Restriction Act, designed to exclude non-Europeans, which 
was to remain in force until the 1970s.
After the Second World War the Australian Government set up a Department of 
Immigration. Policy-makers believed that Australia's population of 7.5 million 
needed to be increased both for economic and strategic reasons. Immigration levels 
have been high throughout the post-war period, ranging from a minimum of about 
50,000 settlers per year to a maximum of 185,000 settlers. Net migration has 
accounted for about 40 per cent of the growth in population to currently about 17 
million (NPC, 1991: 21). About five million people from some 100 countries have 
come to Australia as settlers since 1945 (BIR, 1990: 32). In 1947, nearly 90 per cent of 
the population were Australian-born, and most of the rest were from the UK. By 
1986, the Australian-born share had fallen to 79 per cent, while 21 per cent of the 
population were overseas-born. Just over half of these are of non-English speaking 
background (NESB), which is the usual official label for cultural distinctiveness. 
Moreover, 20 per cent of the Australian-born had at least one immigrant parent. 
Immigrants and their immediate descendants make up a higher proportion of the 
population than in any other developed country.
This shift from relative homogeneity to great diversity was not the intention of the 
post-war immigration program. When it started, Immigration Minister Calwell 
promised the Australian public that there would be ten British immigrants for 
every 'foreigner'. It was widely believed that non-British immigration would 
threaten national identity and social cohesion (Borrie, 1947; Wilton and Bosworth, 
1984). But once it had become clear that immigration from Britain would be 
insufficient to sustain demographic and economic growth, the Australian 
Government looked elsewhere. In the late 1940s the Department of Immigration 
recruited in Displaced Persons Camps in Europe, giving preference to refugees from 
Baltic and Slavonic countries, who were perceived as both 'racially acceptable' 
and anti-communist. Altogether 180,000 eastern Europeans migrated to Australia 
from 1947 and 1951, making up 37 per cent of migrants in those years (Collins, 1988: 
24). There was also considerable immigration from Germany, the Netherlands and 
Scandinavia.
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By the 1950s the Cold War virtually stopped eastern European migration, while 
economic revival in northern Europe gradually reduced movements from that region. 
There was great reluctance to admit southern Europeans, who were seen as 
culturally different and politically suspect, due to the strength of the communist 
parties of Italy and Greece. Some commentators saw northern but not southern 
Italians as assimilable (Vasta, 1990). But the pressing need for labour led to 
recruitment agreements with most southern European countries. In the 1950s and 
1960s most migrants came from Italy, Greece and Malta.
A two-class system of immigration developed: British migrants, and many northern 
Europeans too, were given assisted passages, could bring their families at once and 
had full labour-market and civil rights upon arrival. Those from eastern and 
southern Europe were less likely to get an assisted passage, had no automatic right 
to family reunion, were frequently directed into undesirable jobs and were generally 
treated as inferior (Collins, 1988: 23-4). But there was a third, invisible, class: 
those who were not admitted at all. The White Australia Policy kept out all non­
whites, and was applied so zealously that even the Asian wives of Australian 
soldiers who had served overseas were excluded.
Immigration remained high throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and was widely seen 
as a major cause of Australia's prosperity. By the late 1960s it was becoming hard to 
attract southern European workers, and many were returning to their homelands. 
The result was a series of measures to attract and retain migrants: further 
liberalisation of family reunion, recruitment in Yugoslavia and Latin America, and 
some relaxation of the White Australia Policy.1 But when the world recession of 
the 1970s hit Australia, the first reaction of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
Government was to reduce immigration (the average level was 56,000 per year from 
1971 to 1976). It also finally abolished the White Australia Policy, introducing 
entry criteria which did not discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or 
national origin.^ The succeeding Liberal-Country Party Government increased 
immigration to around 100,000 per year in the late 1970s and early 1980s. At the
1 The move away from in racism in immigration policy was matched by trends towards 
improving the formal status of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, who were granted 
citizenship for the first time following a referendum in 1967. However, the economic and 
social situation of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders remains disastrous today, a 
theme which cannot be dealt with in this paper.
2 Entry rules which are formally non-discriminatory do not necessarily exclude informal 
discrimination in the administrative practices through which they are implemented. 
There is no space to examine this issue in the present paper.
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same time, the Indo-Chinese crisis led to the arrival of refugee boats from Vietnam. 
To prevent spontaneous and potentially uncontrollable entries of boat-people, Prime 
Minister Fraser agreed to join the international relief effort. This led to the 
planned entry of large numbers of Vietnamese refugees, soon followed by refugees 
from the Civil War in Lebanon. By 1980,22 per cent of new immigrants were Asians 
(Collins, 1988: 26). Australian openness to family reunion quickly led to enduring 
patterns of chain migration from these areas.
Current Immigration Policy
Recent immigration levels have fluctuated according to economic conditions and 
government policies. They were low (60,000-100,000) in the recession of the early 
1980s and high in the period of economic growth in late 1980s (up to 140,000 per 
year). In the current recession, immigration has declined somewhat, and there are 
calls for considerable cuts to economic migration. This contrasts with recent 
decisions in the USA and Canada, where skilled migration is being sharply 
increased. The Australian debate is marked by a short-term perspective, and a lack 
of forward planning: if skilled entries are cut now, the delays in processing built 
into the selection system will mean that the actual cuts in entries will come just in 
time to create skilled labour bottlenecks as economic recovery begins.
Immigration from Asia (particularly south-east Asia and the Indian sub-continent) 
is now the largest component of entry, making up 35-45 per cent of total intakes. 
However, entries from the UK and New Zealand also remain high. From 1988-91 a 
total of 388,000 settlers entered Australia. The top ten countries of origin were:
UK and Ireland (75,000) New Zealand (42,000)
Hong Kong (29,000) Malaysia (20,000)
China (19,000) Vietnam (32,000)
Philippines (22,000) India (11,000)
Sri Lanka (6,000) South Africa (5,000).
In late 1991, an Asian country, Hong Kong, for the first time overtook the UK as the 
largest single source country for immigrants. Relatively few western Europeans 
(apart from the British) have come to Australia in recent years. However there 
was considerable Polish immigration in the early 1980s. More recently, the end of 
Soviet domination in eastern Europe has led to contradictory trends: on the one
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hand, some eastern European settlers of the post-war period—or their 
descendants—have opted to return; on the other hand, there has been an upsurge in 
applications for migration to Australia at consulates in the Soviet Union and other 
Eastern European countries. A new wave of eastern European migration seems 
possible.
A detailed discussion of the complex legal, institutional and administrative 
framework which regulates immigration and settlement is not possible here (see 
CAAIP, 1988; Castles, 1989), however, some central features should be noted. 
Immigration levels are decided upon annually by the Federal Government. Program 
implementation is the responsibility of the Department of Immigration, Local 
Government and Ethnic Affairs (DILGEA). Prospective immigrants apply to 
Australian consulates abroad, where they may be interviewed by Immigration 
Officers. Medical and occupational tests may also take place. Currently about one 
million people apply each year, of whom about 100,000 are successful. There are 
three main immigration categories:
— Family Migration, the largest category, since all permanent immigrants 
have rights to family reunion. The Immediate Family (spouse and 
children) are admitted automatically, while more distant relatives 
(siblings, parents, etc) are assessed according to a Points System. In 1989- 
90 the Program Target for Immediate Family was 41,000 and for Extended 
Family 30,000. The total in the Family category was 71,000.
— Economic Migration. This is sub-divided into various sub-categories, such 
as Business Migration (Program Target 1989-90,10,000), Employer 
Nominations (11,000), Independents (i.e. individual applicants assessed 
on the Points System: 23,500) and the Occupational Shares System (i.e. 
occupations classified as in demand in Australia: 9,000). The total in the 
Economic category was 54,000.
— Humanitarian Migration. This comprises refugees selected in cooperation 
with the UNHCR in refugee camps (e.g. Vietnamese in Thailand) as 
well as some 'in-country humanitarian applicants' selected in their 
country of origin (e.g in El Salvador). There is also a relatively small but 
growing number of people who apply for refugee status when already in 
Australia on temporary entry permits. The Program Target for this 
category was 14,000 in 1989-90.
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Economic migration makes up less than half the total intake. It is this component 
which is easiest to reduce in times of recession. Economic migration generates future 
chains of migration, due to the rights to family reunion. This also applies to the 
other categories: refugees can bring in their dependents just like other migrants, 
while people admitted through family reunion can then bring in further family 
members. The Points Test, used for several categories, is based on a model developed 
in Canada, and was first introduced in 1973. In the current version, points are 
awarded for work skills, age, language skills, and family relationships with 
residents or citizens of Australia. The Points System is complex and hard to apply 
fairly. It is not discriminatory on racial, ethnic, religious or political criteria, but it 
does discriminate in favour of young, economically productive people who have 
been able to receive a good education. It tends to select either people from highly- 
developed countries or an elite from less-developed countries, thus encouraging the 
'brain drain'.
The Australian immigration system has always been based on the primacy of 
permanent immigration of potential citizens. However, in recent years the number 
of temporary entrants has grown. These are made up of students and trainees, as 
well as temporary workers with special skills, often moving within the framework 
of transnational companies. There is a certain slippage from temporary into 
permanent immigration, through the possibility of applying for transfer to 
permanent status.
The Emergence of Multiculturalism
The post-war immigration program was designed to maintain the integrity of 
Anglo-Australia, but in fact achieved the opposite, bringing about great ethnic 
diversity. The initial solution to this dilemma was found in assimilationism: the 
doctrine that immigrants could be culturally and socially absorbed, and rapidly 
become indistinguishable from the existing Anglo-Australian population (Wilton 
and Bosworth, 1984). Government measures to encourage successful settlement 
included some special services: provision of initial accommodation and basic 
English courses, help in finding work, and support for voluntary efforts such as 
'Good Neighbour Councils' (Jakubowicz, 1989). But the centrepiece of 
assimilationism was to treat most migrants as future citizens, who were to live and 
work with Anglo-Australians. Naturalisation could be obtained after five years, 
later reduced to three and then two years, and children born to immigrants
12 THE CHALLENGE OF MULTICULTURALISM
automatically became Australian citizens. Immigrants had the right to bring in 
family members, but there was no special educational provision for migrant 
children. (Martin, 1978; DIEA, 1986; Vasta, 1990). Cultural pluralism and the 
formation of 'ethnic ghettoes' was to be avoided at all costs.
By the 1960s, it was obvious that assimilationism was not working. The situation of 
migrant workers was marked by labour market segmentation and social segregation. 
Migrants settled in the industrial suburbs and the inner-city areas close to their 
work, where housing was relatively cheap. Many migrants were living in isolation 
and relative poverty (Martin, 1978). Migrant children were failing at school, often 
due to lack of support in learning English. The result was a series of social policy 
measures including an Integration Branch within the Department of Immigration, 
immigrant welfare grants for community agencies, a Committee on Overseas 
Professional Qualifications, a special law providing for English courses for 
children and adults, English language courses on television and at the workplace, 
and the first steps towards a Telephone Interpreter Service (DIEA, 1986: 31).
From about 1970, immigrants began to be perceived as a political factor, since they 
made up a significant proportion of working class voters. The ALP set up Greek and 
Italian sections, advertised in the ethnic press and selected some migrants as 
candidates (Collins, 1988: 135-7). The victory of the ALP in the 1972 election, after 
23 years of conservative government, seems to have been partly attributable to this 
policy. ALP Immigration Minister Grassby spoke of multiculturalism and explicitly 
rejected assimilation, seeing the increased diversity of society as a cultural and 
economic enrichment. However, the emphasis in ALP policies was not on cultural 
pluralism but on improving welfare and education systems (Castles et ah, 1990: 59). 
Specific measures included the right to invalid and widows pensions, migrant 
housing and low-interest loans, family health insurance, and work-based child­
care programs employing workers of appropriate ethnic backgrounds, (Jakubowicz 
et ah, 1984: 60-1).
When the Liberal-Country Party Coalition was re-elected in 1975, Prime Minister 
Fraser went to considerable lengths to win the support of ethnic community leaders. 
The Fraser government set out to redefine multiculturalism by emphasising cultural 
pluralism and the role of ethnic organisations in provision of welfare services. 
Fraser stressed the value of multiculturalism as a way of achieving social cohesion 
in an ethnically diverse society. The bodies set up to produce and disseminate 
'multicultural attitudes' (Foster and Stockley, 1988: 31) included the Australian
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Institute of Multicultural Affairs (AIMA), and the Special Broadcasting Service, 
which was to provide multicultural television and radio services. The Adult 
Migration Education Program was expanded, and a Multicultural Education 
Program was developed for schools.
Welfare polices towards migrants were reshaped to fit into the neo-liberal agenda 
of cutting government expenditure and privatising welfare. The problems 
encountered by migrants were defined as individual deficiencies, resulting from 
poor English, lack of knowledge of Australian institutions, or failure to adapt to an 
industrial society. Migrant welfare was removed from the mainstream social 
system, and delegated to the ethnic group, through a system of grants to ethnic 
organisations.1 This provided welfare on the cheap, since pay, staffing levels and 
conditions could be lower than in government agencies (Jakubowicz et al., 1984: 81). 
Such funding gave government the opportunity of deciding which ethnic 
organisations to recognise, a useful form of political patronage, which tended to 
strengthen the role of traditionalist leaders.
The Hawke ALP Government, which was elected in 1983, initially continued the 
multicultural policies of the previous government. However, as Australia's 
economic perspectives became more uncertain, people began to question the benefits 
of immigration and multiculturalism. The 'Great Immigration Debate' started in 
1984, with public calls for restricting immigration, particularly from Asia, and 
press campaigns against alleged high expenditures on multicultural programs. The 
campaign quickly took on racist overtones, reminiscent of the 'yellow peril' slogan 
of the past (Blainey, 1984; Markus and Ricklefs, 1985; Castles et al., 1990: 116-38). 
The Government began to believe that there was diminishing support for 
multiculturalism, and in 1986 abolished the Australian Institute of Multicultural 
Affairs, and cut funding for English as a Second Language teaching and for the 
Multicultural Education Program. Plans were also made to merge the Special 
Broadcasting Service with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. However, 
these cuts led to an ethnic mobilisation which threatened the ALP hold on 
marginal seats in Sydney and Melbourne. In an amazingly rapid about-turn, many of 
the measures of 1986 were reversed in early 1987. New policies and institutions 
were introduced to strengthen and re-define multiculturalism.
1 The costs of these were more than defrayed by the 1978 decision to abolish tax rebates on 
remittances to migrants' dependents overseas (Castles et al., 1990:68).
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Multiculturalism as a Public Policy
Today the ALP Government emphasises the economic benefits of multiculturalism, 
arguing that a multicultural population is better placed to respond to the 
challenges of increased international trade and communication, and above all to 
provide the opening to Asia which is seen as crucial to Australia's future. The 
National Policy on Languages, which was adopted in 1987 (Lo Bianco, 1987), has 
the aim of encouraging bilingualism, including the learning of 'languages of 
economic and strategic significance' as well as maintaining the 'community 
languages' of migrant groups. In the social policy area, the government has argued 
the need to move away from services for specific ethnic groups. The slogan of 
'mainstreaming', introduced in the mid 1980s by the New South Wales Government, 
has been generally adopted as a principle for restructuring government services. All 
Commonwealth Government departments are now required to produce annual 
'Access and Equity statements' designed to ensure that their services are responsive 
to the needs of a diverse population.
The most significant statement of the new approach to multiculturalism is 
contained in the National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia (OMA, 1989), 
launched by the Prime Minister in 1989. The National Agenda identifies 'three 
dimensions of multicultural policy':
— cultural identity: the right of all Australians, within carefully defined 
limits, to express and share their individual cultural heritage, including 
their language and religion;
— social justice: the right of all Australians to equality of treatment and 
opportunity, and the removal of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture, 
religion, language, gender or place of birth; and
— economic efficiency: the need to maintain, develop and utilise effectively 
the skills and talents of all Australians, regardless of background.
In the National Agenda (OMA, 1989), multiculturalism is essentially seen as a 
system of rights and freedoms, which, however, are limited by an overriding 
commitment to the nation, a duty to accept the Constitution and the rule of law, and 
the acceptance of basic principles such as tolerance and equality, English as the 
national language and equality of the sexes. Multiculturalism is not defined in 
terms of cultural pluralism or minority rights, but in terms of the cultural, social 
and economic rights of all citizens in a democratic state. The program contained in
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the document is based on the recognition that some groups are disadvantaged by 
lack of language proficiency and education, together with discrimination based on 
race, ethnicity, gender, etc.
A variety of special institutions and arrangements have been established to 
implement multiculturalism. At the central government level, policies are 
coordinated by the Office of Multicultural Affairs in the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet. OMA has a wide-ranging brief, which includes monitoring 
bills and cabinet submissions, vetting departmental Access and Equity Statements, 
and publicly promoting multicultural policies and good community relations. The 
Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (DILGEA) is 
responsible for a range of settlement services, including the Adult Migrant 
Education Program (mainly responsible for English courses); the Grant-in-Aid 
system of support to migrant welfare organisations; and the Telephone Interpreter 
Service, which provides interpreters for all languages throughout Australia. 
DILGEA also funds a quasi-autonomous Bureau of Immigration Research.
Several other departments have special sections concerned with multicultural 
issues. For instance, the Department of Employment, Education and Training has a 
National Office for Overseas Skills Recognition, is involved in implementation of 
the National Languages Policy, and shares responsibility with the state education 
authorities for migrant and multicultural education. Finally, the Federal 
Government continues to finance the Special Broadcasting Service, which provides 
radio and television broadcasts in English and other languages to meet the needs of 
ethnic communities, and to promote wider cultural understanding.
Most states have ethnic affairs commissions (EACs) or offices, which have a role 
similar to that of OMA: they advise the state government, vet new laws, try to 
make state government services more accessible to members of all ethnic groups, 
coordinate language services, and generally promote good community relations. 
State education, health and community services departments generally have 
multicultural units to provide interpreting and translation services, and to plan 
service delivery. There are units to deal with specific problems affecting NESB 
people, such as recognition of overseas qualifications, aged care, occupational 
health, women's issues, and drug and alcohol dependency.
Multiculturalism is a major focus for a number of non-governmental bodies, such as 
the Ethnic Communities Councils and their federal body, the Federation of Ethnic
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Communities Councils of Australia (FECCA). There are multicultural or ethnic 
affairs units in bodies such as the Australian Council of Trade Unions. Special non­
governmental agencies (generally subsidised from public funds) are concerned with 
provision of information and counselling, or improving services for particular 
groups, such as migrant women and youth. However, multiculturalism is above all a 
public policy issue, which has not played a major part in the private sector. The 
private bodies in the area function essentially as pressure groups, calling on 
government to improve resources and services.
Problems of the Australian Model
The preceding account can be summed up by pointing to the central features of the 
Australian model for immigration and ethnic relations:
— planning and strict control of entries by the government;
— entry policy marked by non-discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity 
and national origin, but selectivity according to economic and social 
criteria;
— rapid access to citizenship and other formal rights;
— active social policies and special agencies to deal with the educational, 
social and economic needs of immigrants;
— acceptance of cultural pluralism, within carefully defined limits.
Australian multiculturalism appears to be a necessary consequence of mass 
immigration and growing cultural diversity, which has forced the state to re­
examine social policies, and to address the consequences of diversity for community 
relations and national identity. On the whole, the Australian model appears to be 
fairly successful. It has allowed the efficient management of a migratory movement 
of great magnitude (relative to the size of the receiving population). It has 
provided rapid access to citizenship to people of very varied origins. It has 
facilitated processes of dramatic demographic, social and cultural change with 
surprisingly little social tension. Multiculturalism accepts the legitimacy of 
linguistic and cultural maintenance, and of ethnic community organisations, helping 
to provide the first and second generation of immigrants with the security and self­
esteem necessary for a high degree of social participation at both the individual 
and collective levels. Finally, multiculturalism has permitted a shift from an 
explicitly racist and isolationist notion of national identity to a much more open
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society, more capable of facing up to the new realities of its position in the Asian- 
Pacific region.
However, the Australian model of immigration and multiculturalism has a number 
of problems and contradictions. Firstly, it should be noted that the essential factor 
which has made the tightly-controlled entry system possible is Australia's 
geography: the relative remoteness and the surrounding ocean have made entry 
regulations easy to enforce. The significance of this seems likely to decline in future: 
factors which increase the propensity to migrate to Australia, and make it harder 
to police movements include improvements in transportation, increasing mobility of 
capital and labour in the Pacific region, the growth in temporary movements, the 
establishment of migrant chains and the existence of ethnic communities within 
Australia. If strict entry control is the price which migrants to Australia have to 
pay for a generous system of rights once they get in, then both sides of the equation 
may soon look shaky.
Secondly, Australian multiculturalism is based on notions of culture and ethnicity 
which have changed over time, and which are often not coherent and clear. The 
first approach to multiculturalism—that of the ALP Government of 1972-75—was 
essentially concerned with the economic and social rights of migrant workers. 
Eastern or southern European origin was conceptualized not in cultural terms, but as 
a marker of class position. This was consistent both with the political ideas of the 
ALP and with the fact that the majority of migrants at that time were people of 
peasant origin, who had become manual workers in industry. The Liberal-Country 
Party Government of 1975-82 based its approach to multiculturalism on a 
primordialist concept of culture, seen in static terms as the language, folklore, 
cuisine and customs brought in as 'cultural baggage' by immigrants. The ethnic group 
was regarded as a relatively homogeneous community with its own 'natural' 
leaders, whose mainly traditionalist representation of ethnic culture transcended 
class. Multiculturalism was thus concerned with cultural maintenance and 
pluralism, although within the framework of the 'overarching values' of 
Australian society (Zubrzycki, 1977; Smolicz, 1985), which were also seen in static 
and homogeneous terms. This model also fitted well with the privatisation ethos 
of neo-liberal social policy, since welfare provision could be delegated to ethnic 
community organisations.
The current approach, as summed up in the National Agenda (OMA, 1989) moves 
away from this static view of culture and ethnicity. Cultural identity and
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diversity are now seen as legitimate attributes of all citizens and residents—part of 
the private sphere, which is not to be promoted, but certainly to be protected, by 
the state. Thus cultural rights are not seen as pluralism, let alone separatism, but as 
an aspect of citizenship, to be restricted only where they infringe other rights, such 
as the rule of law, tolerance of others, or equality of the sexes. The shift from a 
pluralist ethnic group model to an inclusionary multicultural one is in part a result 
of the development of the migratory process: away from a rural-urban movement, to 
a much more complex situation including upwardly mobile second and third 
generations, as well as new immigrants of more diverse ethnic, social and 
educational backgrounds (Jayasuriya, 1990). However, although the conceptual 
framework has shifted in response to such developments, it is neither coherent nor 
universally accepted. There is no clear notion of the relationship between ethnicity 
and other dimensions of inequality—above all class and gender. Nor is there any 
clarity about the long-term perspectives for cultural difference and ethnic identity 
within Australia. It is not surprising then, that actual policies and practices have 
a contradictory and transitional nature, containing elements of the previous 
approaches.
Thirdly, the multicultural definition of citizenship in The National Agenda 
appears to leave no role for specific social policies for ethnic minorities. But in 
practice there is still a wide range of specialised services and agencies, and ethnic 
organisations lobby for their continuation and improvement. There is a very real 
problem here: basing service delivery on ethnicity tends to segregate and 
marginalize migrants, but ignoring ethnicity and catering for migrants only within 
general services can mean neglecting special needs and perpetuating structural 
discrimination. In any case there is a big gap between the ideology of equity and 
the real persistence of inequality and social marginalization. People who belong to 
certain ethnic groups (particularly southern Europeans, Latin Americans, Lebanese, 
Turks and Indo-Chinese) tend to have lower occupational status, lower incomes, 
higher unemployment rates and a variety of special health and educational needs 
(DIEA, 1986; ABS, 1989). Ethnicity is therefore still a marker of class position for 
certain groups.
Fourthly, the ethnic group model which emerged in the late 1970s provided a 
recognised socio-political role for ethnic associations, which put a premium on the 
construction of culturally-based definitions of needs. Indeed it has been argued that 
pluralist models of welfare delivery actually helped to construct a special form of 
ethnicity, and the organisations and leaderships which went along with it
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(Castles et a l ,  1990: chapter 4; Jakubowicz et a l ,  1984). Such leaderships have an 
interest in presenting a view of homogeneous and relatively permanent ethnic 
communities, with common needs. Although this concept of the ethnic community is 
becoming increasingly questionable, and does not match the current approach to 
multiculturalism, the government cannot ignore the political influence of ethnic 
organisations. Thus despite the emphasis on rights of 'all Australians' in the 
National Agenda, OMA, DILGEA and other government bodies continue to subsidise 
ethnic organisations in a variety of ways.
Fifthly, major Australian institutions in both the public and private sectors are 
still based on British, US and—to a lesser extent—western European models. Their 
structure and organisational culture tend to disadvantage people who show 
differences in appearance, speech, behaviour or values from positions of power. The 
political task of changing central institutions to truly reflect a multicultural society 
has yet to be undertaken.
Finally, immigration and multicultural policies remain controversial. There is 
considerable public debate about levels of immigration, forms of selection, 
expenditure on special services, the meaning of multiculturalism and the effects of 
cultural pluralism on social relations and national identity. Although the major 
political parties all support immigration and multiculturalism, they differ 
considerably on the detailed public policies this entails. The public debate 
frequently takes on racist overtones, evoking spectres of being 'swamped' by mass 
immigration from Asia. Although there are no riots (like in Britain) and little 
organised racist violence (as in Germany), there is considerable evidence of racism, 
taking the form of abuse, harassment and even physical violence, particularly 
against Asians1 (HREOC, 1991). Multiculturalism still has a long way to go before 
it secures universal support.
1 Racist violence and discrimination is most severe against Aborigines and Torres Strait 
Islanders. The HREOC Report on Racist Violence (1991) found that such practices were 
widespread and institutionalized, and that the perpetrators were frequently police 
officers and other officials. This will not be discussed in the present paper.
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Conclusion
Australia has become a society of great cultural and ethnic diversity in a very short 
period. The high level of government intervention in immigration policy has been 
carried over into the areas of settlement and ethnic relations. In this Australia is 
very similar to Canada, but unlike the USA, where the integration of immigrants 
has been largely left to market forces. Multiculturalism has emerged as a formula 
for managing both social policy and identity, and has played a central part in the 
successful model for immigrant settlement and community relations. 
Multiculturalism has changed considerably in recent years. In the late 1970s, its 
language was of 'enrichment' through diversity and 'dignity' through cultural 
maintenance. The focus on cultural pluralism matched both the social policy 
priorities of the conservative government, and the interests of mainly middle-class 
leaderships seeking to articulate the demands of first generation European 
immigrant workers. The experience which transcended class difference was the 
cultural isolation and social marginalization resulting from assimilationism; 
multiculturalism set out above all to redress this. Today, cultural pluralism has 
lost its central role as a minority demand, partly through changes in the economic 
and political context, partly through changes in the make-up of the NESB 
population, and partly because multiculturalism itself has demonstrated that 
formal acceptance of diversity does not in itself necessarily improve the position of 
minorities.
The first generation southern and eastern European cultural brokers are therefore 
losing their leadership role, although ethnic organisations remain significant, and 
governments continue to stress cultural rights. The new leaders are of Asian as well 
as European origin, and belong mainly to the second generation, i.e. they are of 
NESB migrant parentage. They have been educated in Australia, understand the 
system well, and are often employed within the bureaucracy. They articulate the 
needs of ethnic minorities not in cultural but in bureaucratic terms, as expressed in 
the catch-words of Access and Equity. These new leaderships still make use of 
cultural markers, in order to maintain links with their constituency. The concept of 
the ethnic community, as a social category which transcends both class and 
generation, is crucial to their position.
The location of this new NESB leadership group is contradictory: they belong both 
to the ethnic communities (which they construct and mobilise) and to the state (for 
which they work in one way or another). This contradiction reflects the tensions
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within multiculturalism, which is both a public policy designed to manage 
diversity, and a way of articulating minority interests. Similarly, the current form 
of multiculturalism embodies the potential conflict between an inclusionary 
declaration of civil, political and social citizenship for all, and a pluralist model 
based on ethnic groups as interest groups. A further tension exists between the 
guarantee of the right of minorities to be culturally and linguistically different, 
and their exclusion from positions of real power if they exercise that right.
Multiculturalism is likely to be a central element of Australian public policy for 
the foreseeable future. But it has yet to reach a stable and coherent form. Further 
controversy and change are therefore likely. Considerable work is still needed 
before multiculturalism can provide a satisfactory framework for social policy and 
for national identity, in a period when Australia needs to both reshape its internal 
economic and social structures and to re-orient its international relations.
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CHAPTER 2
THE AUSTRALIAN MODEL 
OF IMMIGRATION AND 
MULTICULTURALISM
IS IT APPLICABLE TO EUROPE?
The very centrality of immigration to Australian society has been a reason why 
many European observers have seen no relevance in a comparison, arguing that their 
own countries are 'not countries of immigration', but merely places of sojourn for 
temporary labour migrants from the European periphery. Today, however, the 
myth of temporary migration is breaking down, and the reality of permanent 
settlement and the formation of new ethnic minorities can no longer be denied 
(Castles et al., 1984; Castles, 1986). Moreover, new types of 'South-North' and 
'East-W est'1 migration are rapidly growing in significance. Immigration and 
growing cultural diversity now present major challenges to European societies. In 
this situation, the policies and practices of 'classical countries of immigration' may 
prove increasingly useful.
The Australian Model and Western Europe
How relevant is the Australian experience to current problems in western Europe? It 
is impossible to present a comparative description of the migratory process in 
various European countries here. There have been two main types of immigration: 
migration from colonies or former colonies to the colonial power, and migration of 
workers from the European periphery to the industrial economies of North-West 
Europe, often within the framework of 'guestworker' systems. Although there were 
many differences between these types of migration, there have also been important 
similarities and convergences. A large proportion of both 'colonial workers' and
1 It should be pointed out that these concepts are questionable from an Australian 
perspective. Australia belongs geographically to the South, but culturally, economically 
and politically to the North. Similarly, migrants from Eastern Europe move further East 
when they come to Australia. Clearly the concepts of South-North and East-West 
represent cultural, economic and political, rather than geographical locations.
'guestworkers' became incorporated into the economy as unskilled workers. Both 
have tended to bear the brunt of economic restructuring and the urban crisis, 
experiencing unemployment, poor housing and social conditions, and suffering the 
racism of insecure sections of the local populations (Castles et al., 1984; Castles, 
1986). Both 'colonial workers' and 'guestworkers' have been incorporated into 
society as new ethnic minorities, which experience various degrees of insecurity and 
exclusion (Hammar, 1985).
Improvements in the societal position of ethnic minorities, which were beginning to 
be made during the late 1970s and early 1980s, now seem jeopardized by protective 
reactions sparked off by the escalation of South-North migration in the late 1980s 
and the current development of East-West movements (Alund and Schierup, 1991). 
Clear distinctions between types of migration are breaking down, government 
policies are increasingly difficult to implement (SOPEMI, 1990), and fears of 
economic and social tensions are growing. Immigration and ethnic diversity are 
forcing Europeans to re-examine their social policies, political institutions, cultures 
and national identities. There is a marked tendency towards exclusionary policies, 
particularly towards non-Europeans, and this in turn increases hostility towards 
existing minorities.
Similarities between Western Europe and Australia include:
— large-scale immigration and settlement since 1945, with increasing 
numbers of non-European migrants in recent years;
— institutional and informal practices which initially concentrated certain 
groups of migrants in manual employment, leading to marked 
segmentation of the labour market according to ethnicity and gender;
— residential concentration in urban areas, affected by housing problems 
and poor infrastructure, where competition and conflict with local people 
develop;
— the growing significance of racist discourses, which use the presence of 
minorities as an explanation of economic and social problems, and 
advocate exclusion and discrimination.
The differences include:
— geographical factors which still permit a high degree of government 
control of migration to Australia compared with the increasing difficulty 
of controlling national borders in Europe;
— larger relative size of the immigrant population in Australia;
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— the role of immigration in nation-building in Australia, compared with 
the older established populations of European nations;
— an immigration policy based on permanent family settlement in 
Australia, compared with a policy still based on the myth of temporary 
residence in some western European countries;
— an inclusionary concept of the nation in Australia, where immigrants are 
encouraged to become citizens and quickly gain access to all formal rights, 
compared with exclusionary concepts of citizenship and nationhood 
based on ethnicity in some European countries.
There are clearly important parallels, as well as significant differences between 
Australia and western European countries. The question is: can some of the successful 
elements of the Australian model be usefully applied in Europe, and what changes 
are necessary to make them appropriate in the different context? To answer this, it 
is useful to re-examine the central features of the Australian model for immigration 
and ethnic relations, already mentioned in Chapter 1.
Planning and Strict Control of Entries by the Government
The price for a generous policy of rights for settlers in Australia, has been a high 
measure of control of entries. Immigration levels and categories are worked out as a 
balance between economic needs (e.g. labour demand, the need for specific skills), 
the needs of ethnic communities (for family reunion) and international 
responsibilities (e.g. burden sharing with regard to refugees). At present, there is a 
tendency towards loss of control of migratory movements. It seems to me that this is 
partly because some governments are trying to carry out policies which are 
unrealistic and in conflict with economic, social and political realities. For 
instance, in the German case, trying to maintain the fiction of not being 'a country of 
immigration' at a time of very rapid immigration condemns public policy to 
absurdity. An active immigration policy means setting out levels of immigration 
which are realistic in view of internal and external pressures; striking a balance 
between various types of migration (economic, family and refugee); and setting up 
selection mechanisms which are as fair as possible. Such a policy would have to be 
co-ordinated with policies on international relations, trade and development. 
Migrations will take place whether governments want them or not, as the current 
growth of illegal migration demonstrates. An active immigration policy will not
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solve this problem quickly or completely, but it is the only chance of maintaining 
some measure of control of movements.
Entry Policy Marked by Non-Discrimination on the Basis of 
Race, Ethnicity and National Origin, hut Selectivity 
According to Economic and Social Criteria
There is currently a tendency in western Europe to favour East-West over South- 
North migration. This is usually justified in economic terms (eastern Europeans are 
seen as better educated and more productive), and cultural terms ('after all, we are 
all Europeans'). These arguments lead, in the final analysis to racial and ethnic 
discrimination. Moreover, they are likely to worsen the situation of existing non- 
European minorities by defining them as intrinsically inferior and undesirable. The 
Australian experience of moving from the racist selection criteria of the White 
Australia policy to the current non-discriminatory is instructive here. At the 
beginning of the post-war immigration program, the majority of Australians 
believed that non-white immigration would lead to social conflict and the 
breakdown of national identity. In fact the opening of Australia to non-white (i.e. 
particularly Asian) immigration has not led to a breakdown of the social fabric, but 
rather to considerable economic benefits and an enrichment of society. The lesson for 
Europe is the need to remove any forms of discrimination on the basis of race, 
ethnicity and national origin from immigration rules. This does not, however, mean 
that there should be no selectivity: criteria of education, training, work experience, 
age, etc. can be used in selecting entrants in the economic migration category, though 
not for refugees or immediate family members.
Rapid Access to Citizenship and Other Formal Rights
Perhaps the most important single lesson of the Australian experience is the key 
role of citizenship and of economic, social, political and cultural rights in bringing 
about good community relations. The overwhelming majority of immigrants in 
Australia have become citizens, while all children born in the country 
automatically have citizenship. This gives them access to the political system and 
the opportunity of participation in many social arenas. It also gives them a sense of 
belonging, and the security necessary to develop long-term perspectives. This 
security also makes immigrants less threatening to other social groups: since they
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have full labour-market rights, they are not forced to undercut wages or work in 
clandestine situations. In western Europe, some employers (and even governments) 
are willing to take advantage of the cheap labour provided by clandestine 
migrants or refugees from less-developed countries, while denying them the right to 
secure residence status. Similarly, policies which exclude permanent immigrants 
from citizenship create a situation of marginalization which threatens good labour 
relations and social peace, and which contradicts the principles of representative 
democracy. In the long run there is no alternative to making citizenship available 
to all permanent residents—it should be done sooner rather than later. The 
argument often advanced against it—that many immigrants do not want to give up 
their existing citizenship—is in fact a reason for accepting dual citizenship, or for 
developing forms of latent citizenship, rather than denying it to permanent 
residents.
Active Social Policies and Special Agencies to Deal with the 
Educational, Social and Economic Needs of Immigrants
The Australian state provides support services for the settlement process, such as 
reception centres for new arrivals, help in finding employment, language courses, 
special educational support for immigrant children and translating and 
interpreting services. Such services are seen as a central aspect of multiculturalism, 
in accordance with the principle that all government agencies should make their 
services appropriate and accessible to people of different ethnic backgrounds. They 
are complemented by equal-opportunities and anti-discrimination laws, and 
special agencies to implement these. Clearly, special services of various kinds 
have also been introduced in all western European countries to help deal with 
problems of immigration and settlement. The Australian experience is that it is 
important to move away from piecemeal and ad hoc social policies in this area. 
Multicultural social policy should be regarded as a long-term necessity, and not 
simply a transitory part of the settlement process. Moreover, such measures should 
be understood as citizenship rights, crucial to securing the full participation of 
people of diverse ethnic backgrounds in a pluralist society.
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Acceptance of Cultural Pluralism, within Carefully Defined 
Limits
Australia's post-war immigration program and the policy of assimilation were 
designed to maintain cultural homogeneity. The emergence of multiculturalism was 
a reaction to an unplanned development, but it has proved highly successful as a 
way of maintaining good community relations in an ethnically diverse society. 
Multiculturalism sets out to define the relationship between the cultural rights of 
individuals and groups, and the rule of law in a secular society. In the National 
Agenda for a Multicultural Australia (OMA, 1989), multiculturalism is set out not 
in terms of minority rights, but as system of rights for all citizens in a democratic 
state. In this understanding, multiculturalism is not a way of protecting possibly 
repressive and separatist cultures, but a new statement of the division between the 
public and the private in civil society. In Europe today, many people cling to the 
idea of ethnic homogeneity, and want to turn the clock back to an imagined 
monocultural community. They feel threatened by the idea of difference, and above 
all by the possibility of loss of modernity and secularity, which seems to be 
embodied in the perceived cultures of certain immigrant groups. Multicultural 
policies based on the Australian model could provide a way of safeguarding the 
cultural rights and specific interests of minority groups, while allaying the fears of 
some members of the ethnic majorities.
In fact European societies have always been marked by migrations and cultural 
interaction. Contemporary mass migrations, together with trends towards 
globalization of economy and culture, are certain to bring about increased cultural 
pluralism and ethnic diversity. Current tendencies towards exclusionism—the 
'fortress Europe' mentality—and romantic and often violent attempts to return to an 
illusory ethnic purity can do a great deal of harm, but they cannot permanently stop 
the process of cultural change. In Australia, the very volume and diversity of 
immigration, together with the changing position of the country in international 
economic and political relations, have forced people to come to terms with such 
realities, and to work out a blueprint for a multicultural society. The Australian 
model is far from perfect: it contains unresolved contradictions and problems, and is 
constantly changing. Nonetheless, my conclusion is that the Australia experience 
can provide useful impulses—if not easy answers —for Europeans.
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PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1990s: 
TWELVE HYPOTHESES
This paper will not examine current migrations and the situation of ethnic 
minorities in particular western European countries. Rather my aim is to look at 
global patterns of migration and ethnic minority formation, and to relate these to 
general tendencies in world political economy and cultural development. Then I 
will examine the possible meaning of these trends for migrations and minorities in 
western Europe, in particular with regard to government policies, racism, 
citizenship and national identity. Finally, I will discuss some consequences: on the 
one hand for the theoretical approaches and research methodology of social 
scientists; on the other hand for the political demands and aims of the anti-racist 
movement. In view of the very general and provisional nature of my considerations, 
I will put them in the form of twelve hypotheses, which I will try to explain and 
justify.
1. The world is entering a new phase of mass population 
movements, in which migration to Europe and the situation 
of ethnic minorities in Europe can only be fully understood 
in a global context.
At the beginning of the 1980s, there was a widespread belief that mass migrations 
to Western Europe had, for the time being, ended, allowing a phase of stabilisation 
of immigrant populations. The stopping of labour migration to most countries 
following the 'oil shock' of 1973-4, and the gradual completion of processes of 
family re-union (despite attempts by some governments to prevent them), seemed to 
provide conditions under which the 'new ethnic minorities' could settle and 
establish community structures. This stabilisation facilitated gradual 
improvement in the socio-economic situation and the civil and political rights of
immigrants. This was the context for debates on pluralism, multicultural policies 
and measures against discrimination and racism.
The situation changed dramatically in the late 1980s. There was a rapid increase 
in volume of migrations to North America1, Australia and Western Europe. There 
was also growth in migrations concerning the countries of the South (SOPEMI, 
1990), including rural-urban movements within less-developed countries (LDCs), 
between various LDCs, from LDCs to newly-industrialising countries (NICs) and 
between LDCs and oil countries. The 'new migrations' were new in areas of origin 
and destination, with more and more countries and regions being drawn into 
migratory relationships: for instance, the Southern European countries which had 
experienced mass emigration until the early 1970s now became areas of immigration 
from Africa and Asia. The migrations were new with regard to the characteristics 
of migrants: for instance the increasing participation of women workers, and an 
emerging polarisation of skills with both unskilled and very highly qualified 
personnel participating. They were also new with regard to forms of migration: 
former 'guestworker' countries now became the destinations of family migration and 
refugee movements, while new 'guestworker systems' developed in the oil countries. 
The overwhelming trend, however was towards spontaneous movements— 
uncontrolled though not necessarily unwanted—by governments and employers, and 
often taking the form of illegal or refugee movements.
At present there are estimated to be 80 million migrants (that is, people living 
permanently or for long periods outside their countries of origin)—the equivalent of 
1.7 per cent of world population. Thirty million of these are said to be in 'irregular 
situations' and 15 million are refugees or asylum seekers (IOM, 1990). The new 
trends are generally summed up in the catch-words South-North migration and, 
most recently, East-West migration.2
1 In the case of the USA, the growth got under way following the new Immigration Act of 
1965, which repealed the restrictive and racist measures which virtually stopped mass 
immigration from the early 1920s.
2 It should be pointed out that these are Eurocentric terms. There are countries of the 
Southern hemisphere (like Australia) which belong politically, economically and 
culturally to the North and West, and which receive increasing numbers of migrants 
both from Asia and Eastern Europe. Similarly, some countries of Europe (like Yugoslavia 
and even Britain) are taking on some of the characteristics of LDCs, with regard to the 
way they participate in the international division of labour.
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In the case of Western Europe the number of asylum-seekers increased throughout 
the 1980s, and then jumped at the end of the decade, mainly due to increased 
movements from Eastern Europe. However, entries of workers and of family 
members of previous migrants also rose sharply in the late 1980s (SOPEMI, 1990)
2. Previous distinctions between types of migrations are 
becoming increasingly meaningless. This is undermining 
state migration policies.
Migration policies (where they existed at all!) have been premised on the belief 
that fairly neat distinctions could be drawn between types of migration, such as: 






Another distinction regarded as highly significant has been between temporary 
migrants (usually workers) and permanent settlers.
Such distinctions have been central to a variety of official systems, including the 
Australian immigration categories, the US Preference System, the German 
'guestworker' program and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) framework.
Today, such distinctions are collapsing. Migratory chains, once established, 
continue, even when the original policies on which they were based are changed or 
reversed. For example, when the German Federal Government decided in 1973 to 
stop labour migration and to encourage return migration, the main migratory 
chain—that from Turkey—continued to develop, initially in the form of family re­
union, then through refugee entries (Blaschke, 1990). Similarly, what appears as 
entrepreneurial migration, may in fact be essentially a form of permanent family 
movement, as in the case of some South-East Asian migration to Australia, Canada 
and the USA.
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The classic case for the erosion of neat categories is that of refugees and asylum 
seekers. The overwhelming majority of these do not fall under the criteria of 
individual persecution of the UN Convention definition, even though they are 
forced to leave their countries by war, famine, economic pressure, ethnic persecution 
or ecological catastrophe (Ministry of Labour, Sweden, 1990). For the year 1990, the 
UNHCR estimated the re-settlement needs for refugees at just 150,000, and called 
on governments to be less generous to asylum-seekers who did not meet UNHCR 
criteria, because giving them support might divert efforts from 'real' refugees 
(UNHCR, 1989: 2). The huge gap between the UNHCR figure, and the world's 15 
million refugees and asylum-seekers casts doubt on the viability of the Convention 
definition, and points to the pressing need for new international policies on refugees 
and asylum-seekers.
The overall effect of this situation is a general break-down in regulation of 
migration and settlement by governments or supra-national bodies. As the OECD 
has pointed out, policies to contain migratory flows are becoming 'difficult to 
implement' and there is a growth in illegal movements to Europe as well as to other 
regions (SOPEMI, 1990). Certainly there are no comprehensive joint European 
policies on migration and refugees. However, where there are moves towards such 
policies—such as through the Shengen and Trevi agreements—the emphasis is on 
restriction and exclusion rather than on rational and humane immigration policies, 
or on providing more effective support to refugees.
3. The growing disparities between economic, social and 
demographic conditions in South and North (and East and 
West) provide the context for future mass migrations.
In the 1990s, 90-100 million people will be added to world population every year. 
By 2025, world population is expected to almost double to 8.5 billion people. While 
the industrialised regions are projected to grow relatively little from 1.2 billion 
people in 1990 to 1.35 billion in 2025, the LDCs will increase from 4 billion to 7.15 
billion (IOM, 1990). This will lead to a vast increase in demand for jobs: the total 
labour force of the LDCs is projected to grow by 733 million between 1990 and 2010. 
For comparison, this is more than the total current labour force of the industrialised 
countries—586 million in 1990. The LDCs need to create 36 million new jobs each 
year in the 1990s—a target which seems quite unattainable in the light of the 
performance of the last few decades (Golini et al., 1990).
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Population growth in LDCs is linked with rural-urban migration and rapid 
urbanisation. In 1970, there were only 20 cities in the world with more than 5 
million inhabitants. By 2000, there are expected to be 44—and most of them will be 
in LDCs. The largest cities in the world are expected to be Mexico City and Sao 
Paulo with 24 million people each. Other huge cities in LDCs will include Calcutta 
(16 million), Bombay (15 million), Teheran (14 million) and Jakarta (13 million). 
Poor housing, lack of social infrastructure and high unemployment are likely to 
make these cities unattractive places in which to live.
It seems obvious that these demographic and social factors will create enormous 
pressures for South-North migration (Zolberg, 1989). In terms of the simple push- 
pull models which were used to explain migrations in the 1960s, one could argue the 
pull factors were the main explanatory factor during the mass labour migrations to 
Western Europe from 1945 to about 1973: migrant workers came either because they 
were recruited or because they had a justified expectation that they would find a 
job (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 25-28). During recessions, labour migration declined. 
In the 1980s, this changed: the push factors became dominant and people came 
mainly because the conditions of life were completely intolerable in the area of 
origin. Even unemployment and a marginal existence in the North became 
preferable to staying in the South. In other words, such movements will continue 
whatever the labour market situation and the policies of governments in the 
North.
However, push-pull theories—generally based on simplistic human capital 
theories—have only a very limited explanatory value. It is necessary to look 
beyond individual movements and their immediate causes, if we wish to 
understand the fundamental processes.
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4. Economic, social and demographic disparities alone do 
not cause migration. Rather, the movements are an 
expression of the interdependence between sending and 
receiving areas within the political economy of the world 
market. Moreover once movements start, they often lead to 
chains of migration, which continue even when the initial 
causes or government policies have changed.
It has long been obvious that it is usually not people from the very poorest countries, 
nor the most impoverished people within a given area who are most likely to 
migrate. Migration requires resources, both financial and of cultural capital. People 
do not simply decide as individuals to move to another country to maximise their 
life chances. Most migration is based on existing economic and social links, 
connected with colonialism, international trade and investment, or previous 
migratory movements. For example the US Bracero Program of the 1940s started a 
long-term migratory movement from Mexico to the USA, just as the German 
'guestworker' program led to a permanent chain of Turkish migration. Research by 
Sassen (1988) has shown the strong links between investment, trade and migration; 
increasing mobility of capital in the contemporary world economy is a principal 
determinant of labour mobility. International migration is thus a collective 
phenomenon which arises as part of a social relationship between the less- 
developed and more-developed parts of a single global economic system (Portes and 
Borocz, 1989).
Realisation of these links have an important consequence. Many people believe 
that economic development of the countries of the South will reduce emigration. 
The left has long called for 'development aid instead of migration', while the neo­
liberal slogan has been 'trade in place of migration'. Today we must understand 
that economic development, at least in the short and medium term will lead to 
increased emigration from the poorer countries (see Tapinos, 1990). This is because 
the development process—i.e. bringing less-developed areas into the world 
economy—leads to such severe disruption of existing societal structures that 
previous ways of living become unviable, and migration appears as the only 
solution. In very general terms, the process has the following stages:
— interaction with developed countries through colonialism, trade, aid and 
foreign investment;
— rural development (the 'Green Revolution');
— rural-urban migration;
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— emergence of large cities with poor social conditions and lack of 
employment opportunities;
— improved education but insufficient jobs for graduates, leading to the 
'brain drain';
— cultural influence of the rich countries through mass media, tourism, 
commodification of cultural products;
— better transport and communications;
— temporary labour migrations;
— permanent movements to richer countries;
— establishment of links between migrant communities in rich countries and 
areas of origin, strengthening the cultural influence of rich countries, and 
sustaining migratory chains.
A good example for the way this process has worked for a successful NIC is Korea, 
where the rapid industrialisation which has made the country one of Asia's 'four 
tigers' has been accompanied by large-scale migration, mainly to the USA (Sassen, 
1988: Chapter 4). However, this relationship between industrialisation and 
emigration should hardly surprise us, when we remember that Britain's industrial 
revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries was marked by mass overseas emigration 
of proletarianised farmers and artisans.
Thus the current upsurge in South-North migration is essentially a reflection of the 
economic, social and cultural crisis in many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, caused by the post-colonial mode of incorporation into the world 
capitalist economy. The end of the Cold War adds a new political dimension: as 
long as there was a Second World which provided an alternative development 
model, the concept of the Third World had a political significance as a possible 
non-capitalist way to modernisation. The rise of OPEC and the NICs had already 
eroded the economic usefulness of the concept of the Third World. Now the 
political value has been lost too: there is no other way but the capitalist one. Since 
millions of people have already experienced the dislocation, destitution and 
injustice brought about by capitalist development, they are left with no hope of 
realisation of human dignity and rights in their own countries. Migration to the 
North now appears as the only way out.
At the same time—and this is stating the obvious—the end of the Soviet Empire 
means an enormous additional potential for migration to the rich countries of 
Western Europe and North America. Just as with the South, the economic and
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cultural incorporation of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union into the 
capitalist world order is likely to give rise to large-scale migratory chains. In both 
economic and cultural terms, East-West migration is likely to compete with South- 
North movements, making the situation even more complex.
5. The new types of migration correspond with the 
restructuring of the economies and labour markets of the 
developed countries in the last twenty years.
The ending of organised recruitment of manual workers by industrialised countries 
in the early 1970s was not a mere conjunctural phenomenon, but rather a reaction to a 
fundamental re-structuring of the labour process. The last two decades have been 
marked by:
— the 'new international division of labour', i.e. increased capital export 
from developed countries and establishment of manufacturing industries 
in the South;
— the micro-electronic revolution;
— erosion of traditional skilled manual occupations;
— growth in the services sector, with demand for both highly-skilled and 
low-skilled workers;
— emergence of informal sectors in developed countries;
— casualisation of employment, growth in part-time work, increasingly 
insecure conditions of employment;
— increased differentiation of labour forces on the basis of gender, age and 
ethnicity (i.e. mechanisms which pushed many women, young people and 
members of minorities into casual or informal-sector work);
— a high degree of international mobility of highly-skilled workers.
Taking these tendencies together, we can speak of a new polarisation of the labour 
forces of highly developed countries: the old blue-collar skilled working class has 
shrunk, while both the highly-skilled workforce and the unskilled, casualised 
workforce have grown. Social inequality and insecurity has been exacerbated by 
the simultaneous decline of the welfare state. The labour movement has lost much 
of its power and its innovative capacity, in line with the erosion of its former social 
basis.
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Existing ethnic minorities and new migrants have played varying parts in these 
developments. An exhaustive analysis is not possible, but here are a few examples. 
Labour market policies which give preference to nationals have contributed to very 
high unemployment rates for former 'guestworkers' and helped cushion the effects 
of re-structuring for local workers. The highly-exploited work of migrant women in 
the clothing industry has partly counteracted the trend to export of this type of 
workplace to LDCs (Phizacklea, 1990). The emergence of ethnic small business as a 
strategy for coping with racism and unemployment has played an important part in 
urban renewal and in economic change (Waldinger et al., 1990; Tait et al., 1992; 
Light and Bonacich, 1988; Blaschke, 1990). Temporary (and often illegal) foreign 
workers from Poland play a significant role in the German building industry, while 
undocumented African workers pick the fruit and vegetables of most Southern 
European countries. In the NICs, the labour of women rural-urban migrants is central 
to the development of the electronics industry, while attempts at industrialisation 
in OPEC countries have been largely based on migrant labour, both highly-skilled 
and manual. Clearly a new and highly complex political economy of migrant and 
ethnic minority labour is emerging.
6. Current developments in migration increase the 
interdependence between immigration policies and policies 
concerning the rights of established immigrant populations.
From 1945 until the early 1970s, the various types of migration to Western Europe 
appeared as successive historical phases. However, by the 1980s this succession 
was breaking down due to the overlap of these phases with various stages of the 
migratory process. This increased the difficulty of formulating and implementing 
coherent policies on immigration and ethnic minorities. This point sounds 
somewhat obscure and technical, but once elucidated its significance becomes clear.
I have argued elsewhere (Castles et a l ,  1984: Chapter 2; Castles, 1986) that the 
principle post-1945 movements to Western Europe were characterised by a three- 
stage migratory process:
— first, migration of workers;
— secondly, family re-union;
— thirdly, permanent settlement and the formation of ethnic minorities.
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The historical phases were:
a) the immediate post-war migrations: movements of refugees and displaced 
persons, overseas emigration of Europeans;
b) either at the same time or somewhat later, movements connected with 
decolonisation, i.e. the return migration of white settlers to Britain, France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands;
c) the labour migrations of the boom period (about 1950-73), whether of workers 
from former colonies or of 'guestworkers' from the European periphery, which 
affected most Western European countries1’
d) the period of economic restructuring from about 1973 to the mid-1980s, marked by 
relative absence of labour migration, some return migration and the virtual 
completion of family re-union for certain ethnic groups;
e) The period which started in the mid-1980s, in which there are new migrations of 
a variety of types simultaneously, as already described.
For the purposes of the present discussion we can ignore phases a) and b) because 
they did not lead to the formation of ethnic minorities in Western Europe. It is 
evident that there was a high degree of correspondence between phases c) and d) 
and the three stages of the migratory process. In policy terms this meant that the 
significant discourse in phase c) concerned the recruitment and/or the control of 
migrant labour. Phase d) was the period of consolidation of immigrant communities. 
In this period, policies tended to become split into two areas: migration policy, 
which was concerned with keeping out or repatriating workers and with regulating 
and limiting family re-union, and policy towards established immigrants, which 
was concerned with social and educational measures, and—increasingly as time 
went on—with community relations and civil, social and political rights (see 
Hammar, 1985). The lull in immigration and the relative stabilisation of 
immigrant populations (albeit under conditions of inequality and social 
disadvantage) seemed to offer the perspective of improvement. No new 
immigrations would be permitted, but a gradual integration would be offered to 
existing minorities.
Now, this general interpretation of the situation has its problems: certainly there 
were national variations and countervailing tendencies. State responses were 
inconsistent and changed according to the ideology of the party in power. Moreover,
1 The timing varies somewhat for different countries. The difference is greatest for Britain 
where most labour migration was stopped in 1962 and family re-union took place mainly 
up to the early 1970s. A detailed discussion is not possible here.
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both informal and institutionalised racism were ever-present while racist 
movements grew throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Nonetheless, it seems to me that 
there was a perspective for a gradual amelioration of the situation of ethnic 
minorities, and even for the emergence of multicultural and anti-racist policies in 
some countries. The escalation and diversification of migratory movements of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s has helped reverse such trends. The simultaneous 
existence of the various forms of migration and the different stages of the migratory 
process has thrown state policies into confusion. The division between migration 
policy and policy towards established immigrant groups simply does not work any 
more, and hampers effective measures, leading to a threatening political vacuum.
7. State policies towards migrants and minorities have 
tended to become increasingly complex and contradictory, 
as governments have sought to address a variety of 
seemingly irreconcilable goals; such as:
— provision of labour supplies
— differentiation and control of migrant workers
— immigration control and repatriation
— management of urban problems
— reduction of welfare expenditure
— maintenance of public order
— integration of minorities into social and political institutions
— construction of national identity and maintenance of the nation state.
As the migratory process has matured and new migrations have developed, policies 
have had to address an increasing number of areas, and to deal with ever-more 
complex situations. State responses have almost invariably been piecemeal and ad 
hoc, without any long-term, coherent strategies. This applies particularly where 
governments, for political reasons, have been unwilling to admit the reality of 
long-term settlement and continued immigration (e.g. in Germany, which according 
to the main political parties is still 'not a country of immigration'). To some extent 
the above list of gaols is chronological: the emphasis was on labour supply and 
control of migrant workers in the 1950s and 1960s; on migration control and 
repatriation in the 1970s; on management of the urban crisis and on cutting welfare 
in the 1970s and early 1980s; and on public order, the long-term position of 
minorities and—again—on immigration control in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
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The overlap of these policy goals obviously leads to major contradictions, here are 
a few examples:
— exclusionary policies which deny rights and citizenship prevent 
integration into political institutions and exacerbate public order 
problems;
— immigration control and repatriation threaten the situation of existing 
ethnic minorities by criminalising later segments of migratory chains;
— policies which lead to employment of undocumented workers provide 
cheap labour for certain economic sectors, but also undermine general 
labour market polices, split the labour force and help cause racism;1
— crisis management strategies based on blaming the 'enemy within' 
contribute to racist violence and threaten public order;
— attempts to stabilise national identity through the strengthening and 
naturalisation of ethnic boundaries lead to increased racism and push 
minorities into separatism and even fundamentalism.
To make the situation even more complicated, it became increasingly difficult to 
specify what the state is in European countries, both because of the unclear division 
of responsibilities in the migration area between national and supranational 
authorities, and because of still contested and unfinished re-ordering of the 
division between public and private in social policies. What state is responsible for 
migration policies: the individual states of European countries, the European 
Community as an embryonic all-European state, or even the superstate of the 
North, responsible for imposing the 'new world order' on the South? Balibar (1991: 
17) concludes that there is no 'law-governed state' in Europe and that this leads to 
a 'collective sense of identity panic'. This contributes to the psychological 
insecurity which helps to cause informal racism, as well as providing the political 
space for populist racist movements.
1 Or, as Balibar puts it, The modern state ...opens the door to 'clandestine' circulation of 
the foreign labour force, and at the same time represses it' (Balibar, 1991:16).
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8. Racism in European societies has two sets of causes. The 
first concerns ideologies and practices going hack to 
colonialism and the construction of nation states in Europe. 
The second set of causes derives from current processes of 
socialeconomic and political change. The increased 
salience of racism and the shift in its targets over the last 
twenty years reflects the rapid pace of change in living and 
working conditions, the dissolution of the cultural forms 
and organisational structures of the working class, and the 
weakness and ambivalence of the state.
As many authors have pointed out (for instance Miles, 1989; Rex and Tomlinson, 
1979; CCCS, 1982; Gilroy, 1987), racism has been a significant factor in European 
societies for centuries. Its roots are manifold: they lie in the ideologies of white 
superiority which underpinned colonialism, in processes of ethnic exclusion as part 
of the development of nation-states, in chauvinist nationalist ideologies linked to 
intra-European conflict, and in attitudes and practices towards immigrant 
minorities. An adequate discussion is neither necessary nor possible here. For our 
purposes it is important to realise that Western European countries have long- 
established cultures of racism, which lead to a predisposition to 'racialist' 
immigrants and ethnic minorities, i.e. to categorise alleged differences between 
them and the majority group in either biological or in cultural terms, which are 
seen as 'natural' and hence immutable.
This predisposition may be seen as constant, but it is clear that racism as an 
empirical reality changes over time, with regard to its targets, its forms of 
expression and its intensity. For practical politics, it is crucial to understand and 
explain these variations. There is considerable evidence of increasing intensity of 
racism of all kinds—institutional practices, vilification, discrimination, 
harassment, violence—in most Western European countries since the early 1970s 
(Castles et ah, 1984: Chapter 7). The recent outbreaks of racist violence in Germany, 
the strength of the extreme right in France and the emergence of new racisms in 
Southern Europe all point to a new strength of racist ideologies. Racism appears to 
be taking on a new character which is threatening not only to ethnic minorities, but 
to liberal democratic political forms in general.
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The historical background to this are developments such as:
— the end of European colonialism;
— the decline of older industrial areas, the end of full employment (both as 
a reality and a policy aim), the erosion of the welfare state;
— the social and urban crisis in many parts of Western Europe;
— the economic ascendancy of some former colonies or semi-colonies, 
particularly in East and South-East Asia and oil-producing countries;
— mass migration and establishment of new ethnic minorities in European 
cities.
In the early 1970s, it could be argued that racism had the same character towards 
immigrants workers in all the labour-importing countries in Western Europe, and 
did not depend primarily on phenotypical factors (skin colour) or origins (non- 
European as opposed to European periphery). For example there were strong 
similarities in attitudes and behaviour towards Italian workers in Switzerland 
and black workers in Britain (Castles and Kosack, 1973). By the late 1980s, this 
was no longer the case: there appeared to be a much higher degree of social 
acceptance of intra-European migrants, which contrasted with strongly 
exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants from the South and minorities who were 
visibly different (through skin colour or other phenotypical differences). This 
change can be attributed to a number of factors: the end of migration from the 
European periphery; the absorption of some former European migrant groups into 
citizenship or secure resident status; the decline of individual European 
nationalisms due to European integration; and the tentative and gradual emergence 
of a 'European consciousness'.
The danger is that this 'European consciousness' will be constructed in exclusionary 
and discriminatory terms towards the perceived threat of being swamped by the 
'desperate masses' from the South. Indeed, it is possible that it might be 
constructed as a much narrower Western European nationalism, in view of fears of 
mass East-West migration. An example for the ambivalence of the situation was 
the reaction of Italians to the so-called 'Albanian invasion' of August 1989. On the 
one hand, there were calls for admitting the several thousand spontaneous 
migrants, on the grounds that 'after all they are Europeans too' and desperately in 
need of help. On the other hand, it was pointed out that letting in one group would 
encourage further waves, and, furthermore that it would be hard to justify 
excluding equally desperate people from Africa, except on openly racist grounds. In
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the end, the reaction of the Italian state was uncharacteristically draconian and 
repressive: mass expulsion using military means.
At the moment, a further differentiation is emerging: Muslim immigrant groups are 
becoming the main targets of racist discourses. This is partly because Muslims form 
the largest non-European minorities in France and Germany, and amongst the 
largest in other countries. There is also a connection with historical conflicts 
between Christian and Muslim peoples in the Mediterranean region. A further link 
is with international affairs: in the early 1970s, the recession was blamed on the 
'oil sheiks', while the Islamic Revolution in Iran and more recently the Gulf War 
have led to fears of a challenge to the dominance of the major industrial powers. 
Public debates on the 'population explosion' of the Maghreb increase the perception 
of an imminent invasion. Thus Muslim minorities appear threatening partly 
because they are linked to strong external forces, which appear to threaten the 
hegemony of the North, and partly because they have a visible and self-confident 
cultural presence. The Rushdie Affair took on major significance precisely because it 
linked all these factors. At the same time, such discourses present an ideological 
opportunity to the extreme right: by playing on such fears and linking them to 
European historical traditions, it can take on a new pan-European character, and 
break out of its old ultra-nationalist ghetto.
To sum up, it may be said that the current increase in racism, and the changes in its 
form and character, are closely linked to the processes of rapid economic, social and 
political change affecting the population of Western European countries in the last 
two decades. The main impact of the changes has been on the blue-collar urban 
working class which has seen its economic basis and social situation severely 
eroded. Immigrants and new minorities have become the visible symbol of this 
erosion and hence the target for resentment. Thus as Balibar (1988A: 289-302) points 
out, racism is not so much a result of the crisis as one form of its expression. Racism 
should not be analysed as a working-class phenomenon, but rather as one product of 
the dissolution of working-class culture and political organisation. As popular 
cultures have been pushed aside by mass, international, commodifying cultural 
industries, the power to deal with change and to absorb new influences has been 
lost. As the membership of unions and working-class parties has declined, the 
ideological and organisational basis for an effective response to the attack on 
living standards has been lost (Wievorka, 1991). Thus Balibar (1988B: 272-88) 
argues that the issue is not that of 'racism of the working class', but rather of 'the 
dissolution of parts of the working class into a racist mass'.
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9. The constitution of new minorities, with distinct cultures, 
identities and institutions, is an irreversible process, which 
questions existing notions of national identity and 
citizenship.
The transformation of immigrant populations into new ethnic minorities1 was not 
inevitable. It would theoretically have been possible for immigrants in Western 
European countries to maintain their own languages and cultures, both individually 
and through associations, without any stigmatising consequences. It is only when 
they experience discrimination, and when processes of cultural maintenance are met 
with exclusionary institutional practices and informal racism, that immigrants in 
turn define their group boundaries in cultural terms. Ethnic minority cultures—even 
when they take on traditionalist forms—have the task of self-protection (in both 
material and psychological terms) against a hostile environment.
Today, the reversal of racist and exclusionary policies would no longer be sufficient 
to bring about the cultural and political integration of minorities, in the sense of 
eliminating the need for some degree of organisational and cultural autonomy.2 The 
point is that ethnic minorities are now firmly established, both culturally and 
organisationally, so that Western European countries have no choice but to accept 
some form of cultural pluralism for the foreseeable future. Policies based on 
political and cultural assimilation (the French model) or on exclusionary 
definitions of nationality (the German model) (see Brubaker, 1990) can no longer 
serve as effective forms of integration of the nation-state. The de facto ethnic 
diversity and pluralism of most Western European countries requires new 
approaches.
1 Defined for the purposes of the present paper as: social groups whose boundaries are 
drawn by dominant social groups according to perceived phenotypical or cultural 
characteristics, and which have specific economic, social and/or legal situations imposed 
upon them.
2 Anyway, it is questionable whether this could ever happen in the first few generations of a 
migratory process even under the best possible conditions. It is also questionable 
whether such cultural homogenisation is desirable. These are are issues which will not be 
pursued here.
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10. The Western European countries of immigration are 
being forced to examine the relationship between ethnic 
diversity, national identity and citizenship. Multicultural 
models of membership of civil society and the nation-state 
appear to offer their best solution, but there are substantial 
obstacles to their realisation.
The varying ways in which the 'imagined community' of the nation-state has been 
constructed in Western European countries in the past are losing their viability. The 
presence of new ethnic minorities is only one facet of the challenge. Others include:
— European integration and the emergence of a European consciousness. On 
the positive side this means overcoming the old chauvinisms linked to 
past wars; on the negative side it means erecting boundaries towards the 
rest of the world: the 'Fortress Europa' model.1
— the development of a commodified global culture, borne by transnational 
capital and the mass media, which challenges national cultures.
— emergence of regional movements, often based on the re-discovered ethnic 
cultures of historical minorities within nation states.
— the emergence of a right-wing, populist nationalism as a reaction to the 
failure of modernity to keep its promise of material prosperity for 
substantial sections of the population.
It seems to me that the only viable solution lies in an approach to identity and 
citizenship based on the multicultural models which have emerged in Australia 
and Canada. These are countries which have consciously used immigration as part 
of the process of nation-building, and have in the long-run been forced to revise 
their concepts of national identity and their institutional structures to take account 
of the cultural diversity of their populations. These models are not without their 
problems (see Castles et al., 1990) but they have been fairly successful in managing 
ethnic diversity and maintaining good community relations. The Western European 
countries did not aim to change their demographic and cultural composition 
through immigration, but that has in fact happened, and the current debate on
1 An interesting expression of this is the term 'extracomunitario1 now widely used as a label 
for immigrants from outside the European Community in Italy. The term has become as 
perjorative as Arabe in France or Auslander in Germany. It is a way of homogenising 
difference in exclusionary terms, whereby the core of difference is non-belonging to a 
(new) imagined European community.
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national identity and citizenship must take account of this reality, by moving 
away from monocultural myths.
Certainly there is a debate on multicultural models in Europe. Sweden has gone 
some way to applying them, though with considerable difficulties (Alund and 
Schierup, 1991). It is important to look both at the general principles necessary to 
apply multiculturalism in Western Europe, and at specific issues like the social and 
political rights of permanent settlers, naturalisation polices, citizenship of the 
second generation and minority cultural rights. The main issue, however, is still 
that of the political will to move away from outmoded forms of nationalism and 
the nation-state. Major obstacles to the introduction of multicultural policies 
include:
— the conflict between immigration policy, as a form of differential 
exclusion from the territory and hence society, and citizenship as a way 
of including people in civil society and the nation-state;
— the gap between formal citizenship (as a system of civil and political 
rights) and the de facto restriction of economic and social rights of 
members of ethnic minorities, particularly due to economic restructuring 
and the decline of the welfare state;
— racism and nationalism.
11. In view of the multi-faceted links between the world 
economy, migratory processes, minority formation and the 
transformation of societies of immigration, research in this
area can no longer be mono disciplinary and national in 
focus. There is a need for a multidisciplinary and 
international social science of migration and multicultural 
societies, combining elements of political economy, 
sociology, political science, law, demography, anthropology
and related disciplines.
In the period of mass labour migration to industrialised countries, the focus of 
academic research was mainly on the economics of migrant labour, and on the 
sociology and social-psychology of 'immigrant-host relations'. Later, in response to 
the apparent ending of labour migration and the permanent settlement of 
immigrant groups, more critical approaches developed, which sited labour 
migration in the political economy of capitalism, examined the sociology of
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minority formation and the racialisation of social relations, or looked at the 
politics of crisis management. It is now clear that labour migration did not end, but 
has merely changed its form. Indeed, migration and use of 'unfree labour' has 
always been part of the capitalist system (Cohen, 1987). It is also clear that 
minority formation and racialisation are central aspects of social relations at the 
national and international levels.
What is new is that it has become apparent that all these processes of migration 
and minority formation are taking place simultaneously and increasingly in many 
parts of the world. The long-term result seems likely to be the emergence of 
multicultural societies in many areas, leading in turn to new concepts of citizenship 
and the nation-state. The consequence for critical social scientists working on 
immigration, racism and ethnic relations should be a new awareness of the global 
and all-pervading scope of the subject of research. Monodisciplinary studies of 
particular facets are only justifiable within the context of an interdisciplinary 
theoretical and analytical framework which provides understanding of the links 
between the particular and the general, the local and the global. The study of 
migration and multicultural societies should therefore be understood as a social 
science in its own right, which is strongly multidisciplinary in its theoretical 
approaches and methodology.
12. The increasing volume of migration and its changing 
character, together with the emergence of ethnically 
heterogeneous societies in Europe makes a re-examination 
of political positions essential. Wie need to re-define the 
meaning of 'international solidarity' with regard to 
migration policies and the North-South divide, to examine 
potential contradictions in anti-racist positions, and to work 
out political agendas which can lead to democratic, 
multicultural societies.
Migration has often been an issue of contention within the labour movement, due to 
the potential threat to wages, conditions and organisational unity presented by 
immigrant workers. Policies have ranged from international solidarity through to 
racist exclusionism. Since 1945, the Western European left has generally taken an 
internationalist and anti-racist line. In the current situation, it seems necessary to
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me to re-examine and re-define such positions. A number of dilemmas need to be 
addressed.
Immigration control is by its nature selective, exclusionary and restrictive. Should 
we therefore reject all control and demand 'open borders' (as has recently been 
debated within the German Green Party)? In the present circumstances this could 
lead to large and chaotic flows, resulting in conflict and racism, giving increased 
impetus to the extreme right, and probably—in the long run—bringing about even 
stricter control. On the other hand, there is a realisation by governments and 
international agencies that immigration control, in its present form, is increasingly 
ineffective (Purcell, 1990; Ministry of Labour, Sweden, 1990; SOPEMI, 1990).
South-North and East-West migration can present effective individual strategies 
for survival and improvement in life chances, but it cannot provide general solutions 
to global disparities. The number of people who could conceivably migrate to the 
industrialised countries is only a drop in the ocean, compared with the number of 
people facing severe economic and social problems in the LDCs. There is little 
evidence that migration, under current arrangements, does anything to support 
development in the areas of origin. Indeed individual movements can hamper 
development, for example by withdrawing people with desperately needed skills. 
In the past, the answer to this dilemma was found in the principle 'development in 
place of migration'. As pointed out above, it is now clear that these are false 
alternatives: development and industrialisation actually lead to increased 
migration for a substantial period.
Finally, there seems to be a potential conflict between the ethnic minorities which 
developed out of the labour migrations between 1950 and the early 1970s, and the 
new immigrants. The former see the newcomers as a threat to the gains they are 
beginning to make, and as a catalyst for increased racism. Again, the actual content 
of solidarity needs to be discussed in this context.
There are no easy answers to any of these dilemmas. To find solutions it is necessary 
to perceive migrations and the shift to multicultural societies as a central aspect of 
contemporary global development. For the left in industrialised countries, that 
would mean developing and advocating a coordinated strategy which 
simultaneously addresses issues of migration, multiculturalism, foreign and trade 
policy, and development policy.
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Migration
We do need a migration policy that balances international solidarity with the 
social and economic conditions of receiving areas. That means that each Western 
European country (and supra-national bodies such as the European Community and 
the OECD) needs to accept that a certain amount of both permanent and temporary 
migration will take place, and that it is better to plan and administer this, that to 
drive it underground by trying in vain to stop it. I have in mind something like the 
systems adopted in the USA, Canada and Australia, where regular decisions are 
made on the numbers to be admitted in the categories of economic migrants, refugees 
and family re-union. It is important to demand that all long-term migrants should 
have the right to permanent residence and family re-union, although this does not 
preclude some special temporary admission schemes for students and trainees as 
part of development policies. A further demand is that entry criteria should be free 
of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, country of origin, religion, culture 
or gender. This does not preclude discrimination on the basis of criteria like 
education or training (in economic migration categories), and need (in refugee 
categories).
The demand for a migration policy may seem paradoxical in view of previous 
remarks in this paper on the breakdown of migration control and the erosion of 
entry categories. Nobody should have the illusion that such a policy can be easily 
and fully implemented. My argument is that it is better for countries to have 
policies based on a reasonable amount of immigration, selected according to fair 
criteria, even if these can only be partially effective, rather than to have 
unrealistic and discriminatory policies which lead to chaotic, exploitative and 
conflictual situations.
Multiculturalism
Demands for a fairer immigration system must be accompanied by a struggle for 
improved rights for immigrants and their descendants once in Western European 
countries. In the final analysis, this means working towards public policies of 
multiculturalism. Citizenship for permanent settlers and their children is crucial. 
Where immigrants do not want to give up their previous nationality, dual 
citizenship, or latent citizenship of the country of origin are possible answers. An 
alternative is some type of quasi-citizenship, that gives essential rights, including 
the right to vote, but stops short of actual naturalisation. Multiculturalism also 
implies the guarantee of minority cultural and linguistic rights. These include not 
only the right to individual and collective expression, but also the provision of
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necessary services, such as translation and interpreting facilities, to guarantee 
equal access to courts, social amenities, etc. Measures for children need to be two­
fold: on the one hand support services to prevent disadvantage for children of 
different linguistic and cultural background in the mainstream school, on the other 
hand educational support for the maintenance of other languages and cultures. The 
core of multiculturalism is the demand for full political, economic and social 
participation of all members of society, whatever their ethnic background. 
Multicultural policy therefore necessarily includes a range of measures to counter 
discrimination, to ensure equal opportunities in all areas, and above all to combat 
racism.
Foreign and Trade Policy
Measures to reduce the North-South divide, and, in the long term, to reduce the 
need for migration, are as much issues of foreign and trade policy as of development 
policy. Stopping arms exports to LDCs could be the biggest single step towards 
cutting the number of asylum seekers. Trade policies which change the conditions 
and terms of trade in the favour of the South could make a major contribution. A 
drastic overhaul of the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy is an 
example. New attitudes towards social development in the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and similar agencies would also be important. An important 
demand for the left in this context would be for a new emphasis on human rights in 
all international and trade relations.
Development Policy
As pointed out, in the short to medium term, development in the countries of the 
South will lead to increased emigration. Nonetheless, economic and social 
development is the only long-term solution to current imbalances, and should 
therefore be given priority. That means supporting development policies which 
involve real transfer of resources from North to South. A further demand is to 
include principles of ecologically sustainable development into all investment 
projects. Measures to improve health and social security in LDCs are also 
significant, in view of their long-term demographic consequences. Finally, 
development and migration policies should be linked, for instance through training 
schemes for migrants to provide the skills necessary for economic development upon 
return, or by making investment resources available to returning migrants.
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Conclusion
Such proposals sound utopian, in view of the current priorities of the 'new world 
order'. Even if they were introduced, they would not bring about quick solutions to 
the increasing problems of migration and racism. Global migration is certain to go on 
increasing for the foreseeable future, and it will take place under very difficult 
conditions. Nonetheless, it is important to be able to put forward an alternative 
long-term perspective, because it gives credibility to the more immediate demands: 
those for fair and humane immigration policies, and for the recognition of the 
rights of immigrants within multicultural societies.
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CHAPTER 4
ITALIANS IN AUSTRALIA
THE IMPACT OF A RECENT 
MIGRATION ON THE CULTURE AND 
SOCIETY OF A POST-COLONIAL 
NATION
The aim of this paper is to describe Italian immigration and settlement in 
Australia, and to show how the Italian presence is helping to shape Australian 
society in a period of rapid change.1 Since British colonisation in 1788, Australia 
has been a country of immigration. Apart from the 2 per cent of the population who 
are Aborigines or Torres Strait Islanders, the whole population are immigrants or 
descendants of immigrants. The largest waves of immigration were from about 1850 
to 1890, and then from 1945 to the present. The first wave was mainly of people 
from Britain, whose settlement provided the basis for the construction of Anglo- 
Australia as part of the British Empire. The second wave has been much more 
diverse, consisting not only of Britons but also of eastern and southern Europeans, 
and then, increasingly, of Asians.
There was some Italian immigration before the Second World War, but most came 
between 1950 and 1970. Italian community formation is thus much more recent than 
in the Americas. Today, Italo-Australians are still the largest non-British group, 
but they are declining in numbers, and may soon be overtaken by Asian groups. The 
Italian presence coincides with two major changes. The first is the growth of ethnic 
diversity and the resulting search for a new national identity, no longer based 
simply on British heritage. The most obvious symbol of this is the emergence of 
multiculturalism as an official policy. The second is the end of Empire and 
Australia's hesitant re-orientation towards the Asian-Pacific region. The central 
question is whether Italian influence on Australian culture and identity has helped
1 This paper is based on a book on Italians in Australia edited by Stephen Castles, 
Caroline Alcorso, Gaetano Rando and Ellie Vasta, published in July 1992 in English and 
Italian. The research for the book has been coordinated by the Centre for Multicultural 
Studies at the University of Wollongong, and has been funded by the Fondazione 
Giovanni Agnelli of Turin. The full citations are given in the References. In this paper 
references will be given to the English edition.
maintain a eurocentric view of the world, or rather has helped prepare Australia 
for a post-colonial and post-European future.
Italian Immigration and Settlement
The Colonial Period
The colonies in Australia were established to provide an outlet for Britain's surplus 
population, pauperized and criminalized by the Industrial Revolution. Convicts 
were soon joined by free settlers, with the state playing a major role in organizing 
migration. British settlers drove the Aborigines from the land, and decimated 
them through warfare, disease and removal of their means of subsistence 
(Reynolds, 1987). Australia was established as a white settler society, based on 
British culture and fully integrated into the political and economic structures of the 
Empire. In the 19th century Australia became an important source of food and raw 
materials for Britain, with the gold rushes of the 1850s providing a major stimulus 
to development (Dyster and Meredith, 1990).
Australia, with its vast open spaces and relatively high wages, became a magnet 
for migrants. The population grew from less than 1 million in 1850 to 3.8 million by 
1901. The largest non-British settler group were the Irish, but there were also 
Germans, Italians and other Europeans. Reactions were hostile when Chinese 
workers arrived, first as cheap labour recruited by employers, then as gold miners. 
Violent attacks by white miners were followed by exclusionary laws in several 
colonies. South Pacific Islanders, recruited by Queensland plantation owners, met 
similar reactions. One of the first laws passed by the Parliament, established 
when the Australian colonies joined as a Federation in 1901, was the Immigration 
Restriction Act. This was designed to keep out non-Europeans, and became known as 
the White Australia Policy. It remained in force until the 1960s.
Italian migration started early, though numbers were small. There were a few 
Italian convicts on the First Fleet in 1788. Some Italians came in the early 19th 
century as travellers, missionaries or political emigres. The gold rushes brought 
more, including 2,000 Swiss Italians from Ticino, who formed the first Italian 
community at Daylesford in Victoria. Some were radicals, like Raffaelo Carboni, a 
leader and chronicler of the Eureka Stockade goldminers' rebellion of 1854, which 
played a major role in the development of democracy in Victoria. Most Italian 
immigrants were itinerant male workers, who roamed the colonies in search of jobs
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in agriculture, mines, construction or transport. Most returned to Italy, though some 
settled, often marrying Irish-Australian women. Pascoe (1992: 87-89) sees these 
'scouts' as the first stage in the formation of Italo-Australian communities: they 
did not settle in groups themselves, but started 'a buzz of gossip about economic 
opportunities throughout Australia', which was to form the basis of later chain 
migration.
The 1891 census recorded 3,890 Italians in Australia, of whom only one sixth were 
women. In this year North Queensland employers began recruiting Italian workers 
to replace South Pacific Islanders on the sugar-cane plantations. Italian migration 
grew further in the 1920s, as restrictive immigration laws in the USA closed off 
that destination. It is in this period that Italo-Australian communities begin to 
emerge. Some of the sugar-cane workers of North Queensland pooled their resources 
to purchase their own farms and settled permanently. Other Italians established 
fishing industries in Western Australia, South Australia and New South Wales. 
Cooperation between family members and paesani (fellow-villagers) made it 
possible to purchase boats and equipment, and gave an advantage over the more 
individualistic Anglo-Australians. Fruit and vegetable farming were further 
activities which made use of the Italians' pre-migration experience. Those who 
settled in towns often started small shops, cafes or restaurants. Successful 
immigrants brought in wives, relatives and friends. Soon distinctly Italian areas 
began to emerge in country and town. Social and cultural institutions made their 
appearance, including the Catholic Church, the festa  (or street festival) and 
associations of various kinds (Pascoe, 1992: 89-90). The first Italian regional club 
was the Circolo Isole Eolie, founded in Sydney in 1903.
By 1939, Italo-Australians had a visible presence in many areas, although their 
numbers were still small. The Italian population grew from 8,135 in 1921 to 26,756 in 
1933. In the latter year they were still only 0.4 per cent of Australia's total 
population of 6.6 million, but they were concentrated in certain areas and 
occupations, and appeared threatening to some people. Many Anglo-Australians 
were hostile towards Italians. Commissions of inquiry were set up to investigate 
the effect of Italian immigration on wages. Laws were passed to limit the types of 
jobs non-British migrants could take, and restricting land ownership. There were 
'anti-dago' riots in the Western Australian mining town of Kalgoorlie in 1919 and 
again in 1934. With the onset of war in 1939, Italians were classified as 'enemy 
aliens', even if they had become British citizens.1 They were treated with
1 There was no independent Australian citizenship until 1949.
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suspicion and subjected to surveillance by the security forces. About 10 per cent of 
Australia's Italian population (4,727 people) were imprisoned in internment camps 
(Alcorso and Alcorso, 1992; Cresciani, 1988).
The Postwar Immigration Program
After 1945, Australia embarked on a mass immigration program which was to 
change not only the country's demographic and economic structures, but also its 
ethnic composition and national identity. The Japanese victories in the Pacific in 
1941-42 had convinced Australia's leaders that the country could no longer rely on 
Britain for its security, and that a larger population and a strong economy with a 
modern manufacturing sector were essential. The first Minister of Immigration, 
Arthur Calwell, used the slogan of 'populate or perish' to help overcome working- 
class suspicion of immigration, telling the public that 'we must fill the country or 
lose it' (Collins, 1988: 21).
The aim was to attract migrants from Britain, but not enough wanted to come, and 
the Department of Immigration began recruiting elsewhere. Australia developed a 
system of preference for 'desirable types' of immigrants: the British were at the 
top, followed by northern Europeans, eastern Europeans and finally southern 
Europeans. Non-Europeans—particularly Asians—were to be completely excluded. 
There was great resistance to recruitment of southern Europeans, and only limited 
quotas were admitted in the late 1940s. Nonetheless, southern Europe became the 
main source of migrants in the 1950s, and Italy the largest single country of origin 
after Britain.
Spontaneous movements from Italy started in 1945, and 33,000 Italians came by 
1950. In March 1951 a bilateral accord between Italy and Australia came into effect:
20,000 migrants per year were to be admitted for 5 years. They were to be provided 
with financial assistance by both governments, and with loans from Italian 
charitable organisations. Medical checks were to ensure that only healthy men 
were selected, while criminals, communists and fascists were to be excluded. Initial 
accommodation was to be provided in camps and hostels. However, 1952 was a year 
of recession in Australia, and many of the newly-arrived Italians found themselves 
unemployed and penniless in isolated camps, like Bonegilla in northern Victoria. 
They started to complain about the food, the hostility of the local population, and 
the failure to provide employment. The Australian authorities feared unrest and 
communist agitation. Matters came to a head with riots at Bonegilla, and
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demonstrations by unemployed Italian workers in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane 
(Bosworth, 1988: 614).
As economic conditions improved in 1954, Italian immigration increased. New 
entrants were directed into jobs unwanted by Australians, in infrastructure projects 
like the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme, in heavy industry such as the 
steelworks of Newcastle and Wollongong, or in the new engineering and textile 
factories of Sydney and Melbourne. Others were sent to Queensland to cut sugar 
cane. Once migration got under way, most Italians came on their own initiative. 
Assisted migration accounted for only 20 per cent of total migration from Italy. 
Family reunion soon gathered momentum, since all permanent immigrants had the 
right to bring in their spouse and children, and to sponsor other relatives.
TABLE 1: ITALIAN MIGRATION TO AUSTRALIA 1947-76
1947-51 1951-61 1961-71 1971-76 Total 47-76
Total Net Migration 33,280 179,420 72,333 - 4,463 280,570 
Annual Average__________8,320 17,942 7,233 -892________ 9,675
Note: Figures are for financial years from 1 July to 30 June. Net migration is the number of 
arrivals minus the number of departures. A negative figure means that more people 
departed than entered.
Source: Calculations from Table 2.2 of Price, 1979.
As Table 1 shows, the 1950s and 1960s were the main period of migration from Italy 
to Australia. Over 360,000 Italians came between 1947 and 1976, but about 90,000 
departed, making a net migration of about 270,000. During the period 1951-60, 6.5 
per cent of total emigration from Italy was directed to Australia, with an average 
of 17,000 entrants per year. After 1961 the proportion began to decrease as migration 
to western European countries, or from the South to the North of Italy, became more 
attractive. Only 4.5 per cent of Italian emigrants went to Australia from 1961-70 
(Bosworth, 1988: 616). By the early 1970s, as a result of recession in Australia and 
growing prosperity in Italy, more Italian-born people were leaving Australia than 
entering.
The Italian born population of Australia increased from 120,000 in 1954 to 290,000 in 
1971. Then it started declining, reaching 264,000 in 1990. However the Italo- 
Australian community continued to grow, as children were born to Italian settlers. 
Italians were the largest immigrant group after the British, making up over 12 per 
cent of the overseas-born population in the 1960s. Table 2 gives the figures at
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various censuses. Italian-born people made up 2.3 per cent of the total population of 
Australia in 1966, a figure which fell to 1.7 per cent by 1986.
Most migrants came from Calabria, Sicily, Abruzzi and Campania, although there 
were some from the North, particularly the Veneto and Friuli Venezia Giulia. The 
majority were from rural areas, yet they soon concentrated in Australia's growing 
industrial cities. Most migrants were aged between 20 and 40 when they left Italy. 
They were usually impoverished, and came in order to obtain the means for family 
survival, or to earn the money needed to buy land or pay debts at home. Often their 
education was limited to primary school level, and most had not received any 
vocational training beyond the most basic level. Although there have always been 
some better-educated migrants, the failure to recognize their qualifications in 
Australia has often made it hard for them to pursue their professions: many skilled 
workers and professionals have been forced into unskilled manual work.
TABLE 2: ITALIAN-BORN PERSONS IN AUSTRALIA
Census Year Italian-Born
Population
Per cent of Overseas 
Bom Population
Per cent of Total 
Population
1881 1,880 n.a. 0.1
1891 3,890 n.a. 0.1
1901 5,678 0.7 0.2
1911 6,798 n.a. 0.2
1921 8,135 0.9 0.2
1933 26,756 3.0 0.4
1947 33,632 4.5 0.4
1954 119,897 9.3 1.3
1961 228,296 12.8 2.2
1966 267,325 12.5 2.3
1971 289,476 11.2 2.3
1976 280,154 10.3 2.1
1981 275,883 9.2 1.9
1986 262,435 8.1 1.7
Sources: Australian censuses as reported by Borrie, 1954; Price, 1979; Price and Martin, 1975; 
Jupp, 1988; DIEA, 1983. Note— n.a. = not available.
Most Italians migrated not as individuals, but as participants in migratory chains: 
the first migrant from a certain Italian village, usually male, established a 
bridgehead, finding somewhere to live and a livelihood. Then he was joined by his 
wife, children, relatives and paesani. This pattern was unintentionally reinforced 
by Australian immigration policy: under sponsorship arrangements, Italians 
already in the country could help their relatives get visas by undertaking to 
provide accommodation and work for them on arrival (Burnley, 1988: 626). Thus 
colonies were established—a whole group would move from a village in Italy to a
62 THE CHALLENGE OF MULTICULTURALISM
certain area of an industrial town or a farming district in Australia. This made it 
possible to keep links with the community of origin, and to maintain specific 
dialects and cultural practices in Australia.
Patterns of Settlement
Italian settlement is closely interwoven with the evolution of Australia's economic 
and regional structure. Before 1945, the greatest concentration of Italians (one 
third) were in Queensland, and most of them worked on the land. The introduction 
of cane-cutting machines in the 1960s drastically cut the need for rural labour 
(Menghetti, 1988). Today, less than 7 per cent of the Italian-born live in 
Queensland, and many of these are in Brisbane. Similarly, in Western Australia 
many Italians settled initially in the gold mining areas in the 1920s and in the 
agricultural areas in the 1940s and 1950s. By the 1960s they were moving into the 
Perth metropolitan area, where the great majority live today (Stransky, 1988: 
605).
Before 1945 about 40 per cent of Italians in Victoria lived in country areas such as 
Shepparton, Wangaratta, Myrtleford, Mildura and Swan Hill. Italians in 
Melbourne were mainly in central areas, like Carlton, where many were 
shopkeepers. After 1945, the rapid expansion of manufacturing in Melbourne 
attracted most of the new immigrants. By 1981, almost 90 per cent of Italians in 
Victoria lived in Melbourne. Initially most lived in central areas: Sicilians in 
Brunswick, Pugliesi in Fitzroy and Viggianesi in Carlton. Within a few years, 
many moved out, mainly to the Northern suburbs, in search of better housing 
(Bertelli, 1988: 630-31).
Italian chain migration to Sydney started in the 1920s. By 1933 there were 400 
Italians in the inner-city area of Leichhardt (Burnley, 1988: 627), as well as groups 
of fishermen in Balmain and market-gardeners on the western outskirts. The 
settlers in Leichhardt came mainly from the Lippari Islands, Sicily, Vicenza and 
Udine (Ware, 1988: 618), while the market-gardeners were mainly Calabrians. 
Postwar migratory chains strengthened these communities, for instance Leichhardt 
had 6,000 Italian-born residents by 1961 (Burnley, 1988: 627). Italian settlement 
also increased in the west and south of Sydney, with employment shifting from the 
primary sector to manufacturing, construction and transport. Many market gardens 
became residential areas, as land values increased. Calabrians and Sicilians (some 
of whom had moved from North Queensland) settled in Fairfield in the west of
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Sydney, making it the largest single Italian community in NSW (10,747 Italian 
speakers in 1986).
Italo-Australians Today: a Statistical Overview
The Australian population more than doubled from 7.5 million in 1945 to 17.3 
million in 1990. Table 3 shows that the overseas-born population grew far more 
rapidly than the total population between 1947 and 1971. By 1971, immigrants 
made up one in five of the total population, a share which remained constant until 
1986, reflecting the relative decline in immigration in the 1970s, and then grew 
slightly again. Nearly 5 million people migrated to Australia and settled 
permanently between 1945 and 1989 (BIR, 1990b: 32). Immigrants have come from an 
ever-wider range of countries. Although the British Isles played a major part 
throughout the postwar period, immigration from Europe declined dramatically 
from the 1960s, while immigration from New Zealand, Asia and Latin America 
increased. By 1990, immigration from Britain was only 18 per cent of total entries, 
compared with 54 per cent in 1966. Eight of the top ten countries of origin were 
Asian, and Hong Kong looked set to displace the UK from its top position. As a 
result, the ethnic composition of the population has shifted considerably. In 1947, 
nearly 90 per cent of the population were Australian-born, and most of the rest were 
from the UK. In 1986, 79 per cent of the population were Australian-born and 21 per 
cent were overseas born. Twenty per cent of the Australian born were children of 
immigrants. In other words, over two fifths of the Australian population were 
immigrants or children of immigrants.
TABLE 3: AUSTRALIAN POPULATION 1947-1990
Census Year Overseas -Bom Total Population Overseas-Born 
Per cent of Total
1947 744,187 7,579,358 9.8
1954 1,286,466 8,986,530 14.3
1961 1,778,780 10,508,186 16.9
1971 2,579,318 12,755,638 20.2
1976 2,718,318 13,548,448 20.1
1981 3,003,834 14,576,330 20.6
1986 3,247,301 15,602,163 20.8
1990 3,851,500 17,335,900 22.2
Sources: DILGEA, 1988: Table A3; Census, 1986; BIR, 1992.1990 figures are provisional.
According to the 1986 census, 7.2 per cent of the Australian population were born in 
the UK and Ireland, a further 7.2 per cent in other European countries, 1 per cent in
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the Middle East, and 2.6 per cent in Asia. Two per cent of the Australian-born were 
Aborigines. Figure 1 shows how the composition of the immigrant population has 
changed since 1901.
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Source: BIR 1989: Table A3.
In 1986, the 262,000 Italian-born were the second largest overseas-born group in the 
population, following the UK and Ireland bom.
TABLE 4: THE TEN LARGEST IMMIGRANT GROUPS IN AUSTRALIA, 1986
Country of Origin Number Per Cent of Overseas-
Bom Population
UK and Ireland 1,127,000 34.7
Italy 262,000 8.1









Because Italian migration virtually ceased 20 years ago, there are very few young 
Italian-born people. Most are concentrated in the higher age groups, with 14 per 
cent aged over 64 (compared with 10 per cent of the total population) (ABS, 1989). 
The Australian-born and educated second generation of Italo-Australians started 
entering the labour market in the 1970s and 1980s. Second-generation Italo-
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Australians are still overwhelmingly concentrated in the younger age groups: in 
1986,37 per cent were aged under 15,35 per cent from 15 to 24,19 per cent from 25 to 
34, and only 9 per cent over 35 (DILGEA, 1988b: 84).
Immigrants can become citizens after two years of residence in Australia. The 1986 
census showed that 59 per cent of overseas-born persons had become Australian 
citizens. There are substantial variations for different countries of origin. Only 47 
per cent of persons from the UK and Ireland and 24 per cent of persons from New 
Zealand had taken up citizenship. This compared with 76 per cent of Italian-born 
persons, 91 per cent of the Greek-born, 95 per cent of those born in the USSR and 63 
per cent of persons born in Asia. Anyone born in Australia to parents who are either 
citizens or permanent residents, is automatically a citizen. Australian-born 
children of Italians are therefore Australians, even though they may still speak 
Italian and identify with their Italian heritage. In 1986, there were 300,997 
persons who had been born in Australia with at least one Italian-born parent 
(DILGEA, 1988a: 82). Thus the Italo-Australian first and second generation1 
together made up 563,000 people, or 3.6 per cent, of the total population of 
Australia.
Italians have tended to seek spouses within their own ethnic groups. However 
intermarriage is on the increase: in 1961 only 21 per cent of Italian-born men who got 
married in Australia had Australian-born brides; by 1976 the figure had risen to 51 
per cent and by 1986 to 64 per cent. As for Italian-born brides, in 1961 only 3 per cent 
married Australian-born men; a figure which rose to 23 per cent in 1976 and 49 per 
cent in 1986 (ABS, 1989: 59). These figures show that women are less likely to marry 
outside the Italian community than men, but that the propensity is increasing for 
both sexes. However, a proportion of the Australian-born brides and bridegrooms 
are undoubtedly second (or third) generation Italo-Australians, so that precise data 
on intermarriage with other ethnic groups cannot be given.
The family and home ownership are high priorities for Italian immigrants. Over 
90 per cent of their households in 1986 were family units without non-family 
members living in them. The figure was similar to that for other southern
1 Usage of the term second generation varies. Here we use the term in a strict statistical 
sense, to refer to children born in Australia with overseas-born parents. Some people 
consider that children who were born overseas, but migrated at an early age (for 
example, less than ten) also belong to the second generation, at least in psychological 
terms.
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Europeans (Greeks, Maltese, Yugoslavs), but much higher than for eastern or 
western Europeans (70-80 per cent), Asians (77 per cent) or the Australian-born (74 
per cent). Altogether there were 161,600 households with Italian-born heads, with 
an average size of 3.6 persons (ABS, 1989: 64).
No less than 70 per cent of Italian households owned their own dwellings outright 
in 1986, while a further 19 per cent were still paying off housing loans. This is the 
highest rate of home ownership of any ethnic group in Australia. Italian migrants 
have always been eager to own houses, and have been willing to make great 
sacrifices to do so. It is generally believed that this is connected with their peasant 
origins: lack of land ownership put Southerners at the mercy of the baroni, so that 
owning land and house was always a priority. Owning a house also provides 
security for old age.
The 1986 census indicated that over 2 million people spoke languages other than 
English at home, the most common being Italian (416,000 people), Greek (267,000) 
and Chinese (131,000). One way of getting an idea of the size of the Italian 
community is to compare the number of Italian-born persons with the total number 
who speak Italian at home. The Italian-language speakers includes the majority of 
the first generation, plus those members of the second and third generations who 
regularly use the Italian language, and is a very rough indicator of maintenance of 
Italian culture. Table 5 shows the distribution of Italian speakers by state. Most 
Italo-Australians are bilingual, speaking Italian at home, and English at work or 
school. Often the language spoken at home is a distinct dialect such as Calabrese, 
Sicilian or Friulian (Rando and Leoni, 1992).
TABLE 5: ITALIAN-BORN PEOPLE AND ITALIAN SPEAKERS, 1986
State Italian-Born Italian-Speakers Italian-Speakers
by State (Per cent)
Victoria 109,204 178,097 42.8
New South Wales 73,174 113,203 27.2
Queensland 17,418 26,115 6.3
South Australia 29,607 48,179 11.6
Western Australia 27,751 43,590 105
Tasmania 1,259 1,590 0.4
Northern Territory 1301 1,040 0.3
Australian Capital 2,721 3,951 0.9
Territory
TOTAL AUSTRALIA 262,435 415,765 100.0
Source: Jupp, 1988: 969-71
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Some Italian farming communities still exist, but the major focus of Italian 
communities are the big cities: in 1986 three-quarters of Italian-born people lived in 
Melbourne, Sydney, Adelaide and Perth, and only 16 per cent lived outside the 12 
major urban centres (Ware, 1988: 617-18). There are no exclusively or even 
predominantly Italian areas, but local concentrations are large enough to give 
certain neighbourhoods a typically Italian character. Victoria has the greatest 
absolute number of Italians, with over 100,000 in Melbourne alone. All the main 
Italian areas are parts of Melbourne, either in the centre, or the north. The earliest 
concentration was in the central area of Carlton, which is today an up-market 
neighbourhood, near Melbourne University, with high-class Italian restaurants, 
cafes and shops. Migrants moved out of this original 'little Italy7, buying houses in 
the surrounding suburbs. Others live in Broadmeadows around the huge Ford motor 
works, where many Italians work.
The main Italian areas of Sydney are in the industrial inner-west and outer-west. 
One of the earliest areas of settlement, Leichhardt, has maintained its Italian 
flavour, although many Italians have moved out to surrounding areas, or to the 
sprawling western suburbs. Fairfield has the largest Italian-born population in 
absolute numbers. Outside Sydney, there are two major concentrations: the steel city 
of Wollongong, which has also had an Italian fishing community for many years, 
and the agricultural area of Griffith, which actually has the largest Italian 
percentage of population of any area in NSW. Adelaide has Italian 
neighbourhoods in several central districts, with Italian-born people making up 
over one fifth of the population in some cases. There are relatively few Italians in 
non-metropolitan areas of South Australia. Western Australia has concentrations 
of Italians in its capital city, Perth, particularly in the centre and north of the city. 
However there is also a large and long-established community in the harbour and 
fishing town of Fremantle. In Queensland, Italians are concentrated in Brisbane, 
though many remain in the sugar-cane areas of the north.
Work and Social Mobility
Many pre-1945 Italian settlers had become independent farmers or small business- 
owners, but most of the post-1945 migrants started work on building sites or in 
factories. For example, 68 per cent of Italian workers in Melbourne in 1971 were 
manual production workers (Lever-Tracy and Quinlan, 1988: 55-6). Italian and 
other southern European migrants were often scathingly referred to as 'factory
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fodder'. Most were of peasant background, with little education or industrial 
experience. The 1986 census showed that 6 per cent of Italian-born people in 
Australia in 1986 had not been to school at all, while 30 per cent had left school at 
the age of 12 or younger. Only 1.4 per cent had tertiary qualifications (BIR, 1990b: 
12-15). Even those with skills were often steered into unskilled work. The question 
is whether Italian settlers have been able to achieve upward social mobility in the 
long run.
Figures 2 and 3 examine the employment status of Italian men and women from 1947 
to 1986. The charts show that high proportions of both Italian men and women were 
employers or self-employed in 1947. By 1966, however, about 80 per cent of both men 
and women had become employees. Only 8 per cent of Italian men were employers 
and 11 per cent were self employed. For women the rates in 1966 were 4 per cent 
employers and 6 per cent self employed. However, the trend was reversed in the 
1970s, as Italian-born people left the factories and set up businesses. By 1986, only 
67 per cent of Italian men were employees, while 10 per cent were employers and 17 
per cent were self employed. For women, the figures were 72 per cent employees, 7 
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FIGURE 3
Italian-Born Women by Labour Force Status, Per Cent
Note: Family helpers and the unemployed are left out 





In 1966, the overwhelming majority of Italian born men (68 per cent) were labourers 
and related workers, while only 4 per cent were managers and administrators and 1 
per cent were professionals. The proportion of women who were labourers and 
related workers was 54 per cent, while 1 per cent were managers and administrators 
and a further 1 per cent were professionals. Figures 4 and 5 show the occupational 
patterns for Italian-born men and women in 1986, in comparison with the total 
workforce of Australia.
Figure 4 shows that Italian-born men still have an occupational distribution which 
differs markedly from the overall Australian pattern: they are over represented in 
the manual categories of trades, plant operators and labourers, and under 
represented in the white collar categories of managers, professionals, para- 
professionals, clerks and sales and services. The manager category needs some 
interpretation, since it is generally seen as a high status area. In fact it includes 
small shopkeepers and farmers, so that the fairly high representation of Italians 
does not necessarily indicate upward mobility. For women, Figure 5 shows a 
somewhat similar picture. However the over representation in the manual 
categories of plant operators and labourers is even more marked, and the under 
representation as clerks is also dramatic.
70 THE CHALLENGE OF MULTICULTURALISM
FIGURE 4









Managers Profess- Para-Prof. Trades Clerks Sales, Plant Labourers 
ionals _____________________________ Services Operators
■  Italian Men SI Total Men
Source: Census 1986
FIGURE 5









Managers Profess- Para-Prof. Trades Clerks Sales, Plant Labourers 
ionals________________________________ Services Operators
HI Italian Women I I  Total Women
Source: Census 1986
It is also useful to look at the distribution by industry. In 1966, 39 per cent of Italian 
men were employed in manufacturing and 23 per cent in construction. By 1986, the 
proportion in manufacturing had fallen to 24 per cent and that in construction to 18 
per cent. The decline in these sectors was matched by a shift into the service sectors. 
As for women, the peak figure for manufacturing was 62 per cent in 1954, declining to
26 per cent in 1986 (few women are employed in construction). Again, there was a
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marked shift into the services. A comparison with the rest of the population in 1986 
shows a slight over representation of the Italian born in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and hunting, and a marked over representation in manufacturing and 
construction. The Italian born were under represented in finance, property and 
business, public administration and defence and community services (BIR, 1990a).
The conclusion which emerges is that Italian immigrants have been able to move 
out of manual jobs in manufacturing and construction to some extent in the last 25 
years. This shift is due partly to the decline in such jobs as a result of restructuring, 
partly to the ageing of the migrant generation, many of whom have left the 
workforce, and partly to upward mobility. However, compared with the Anglo- 
Australian workforce, both Italian men and women still remain substantially over 
represented in such jobs, and under represented in higher status white collar jobs. 
But this finding must be modified by two factors. The first is the situation of 
Italians in business. The other is the position of the second generation.
Many Italians used small business as a route out of factory work, when other 
opportunities were blocked by poor English or lack of recognized qualifications. By 
1981,24 per cent of Italian-born men and 17 per cent of women were self-employed or 
employers, compared with 16 per cent of Australian-born men and 12 per cent of 
women. Italians were highly represented in food and beverage manufacturing, 
clothing and footwear manufacturing, construction, retail trade and personal 
services. Distinct niches emerged: one third of all fruit and vegetable stores in 
Australia were run by Italians in 1981, and they played a major part in clothing 
stores, shoe repairers, bread and cake shops, fish shops, take-away food stores, and 
some building trades such as concreting. Although small business was the rule, some 
Italians were able to establish large-scale enterprises, especially in the food 
manufacturing and construction sectors. Business success was generally based on very 
long hours of work, frugality and family cooperation. Italian-owned businesses 
played a major part in community development, providing visible focal points for 
ethnic neighbourhoods, and symbolizing the Italian presence for Anglo-Australians 
(Collins, 1992).
As for the second generation, census figures show that children of Italian-born 
people had much higher levels of educational attainment than their parents. 
There are clear signs of upward mobility. Many children of manual workers have 
moved into white-collar employment, with some reaching managerial, executive or
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professional status. However, it appears that average occupational status levels 
for the second generation are still below those of Anglo-Australians (Vasta, 1992).
The Italo-Australian Community
Forty years after the inception of the main wave of Italian migration and twenty 
years after its completion, is it possible to speak of an Italo-Australian community? 
Certainly there are many sources of division. Patterns of settlement often reflected 
regional differences in Italy. There are also divisions of class between the 
predominantly working-class groups in the main areas of settlement, the successful 
entrepreneurs who have moved up and out, and the middle-class immigrants who 
always had a distinct role. Gender divisions are significant too: migration to 
Australia has led to a questioning of patriarchal family structures by many women, 
who sometimes prefer Australian norms on relations between men and women. All 
these divisions re-crystallise around the generation gap. The second generation are 
better educated than their parents and often have better jobs. Many have social 
relations with people of non-Italian background, and intermarriage is common. The 
second generation often move out of the 'Little Italies'.
Yet it would be wrong to dismiss the idea of an Italo-Australian community, for 
there are tangible signs of its presence. The most obvious lies in the creation of 
Italian space in Australian cities. There are neighbourhoods where the two key 
markets (labour and housing) have been gradually taken over by Italians. Home 
ownership and small business lead to a concentration of the ethnic group, and also 
form the basis for economic security and social networks. Shops, cafes and 
restaurants give streets a visible Italian character, as well as providing points of 
communication. Soon agencies relating to migrants' needs (travel agents, tax 
advisers, etc) are set along with 'ethnic professionals' such as doctors, lawyers and 
accountants.
The communita gives rise to other processes, designated by Pascoe (1992: 94-5) as 
'naming, ritualization and institutionalization'. The first refers to Italianization 
of the names of streets or areas, sometimes through corruption of English words—a 
process linked to the evolution of a specific Italo-Australian linguistic code (Rando 
and Leoni, 1992). Ritualization refers to religious and regional festivals, which are 
transplanted to the new environment and take on new characteristics and
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significance. Institutionalization refers to the establishment of mutual aid 
societies, cultural associations, social clubs and the like.
The institutional structures of the Italo-Australian community are many-faceted. 
The Catholic Church has played a central role. It was an Irish church before large- 
scale Italian settlement, and was not always welcoming towards the newcomers. 
Italians often found the rituals unfamiliar, and missed the social role of the church 
to which they were accustomed. Italian priests, particularly of the Capuchin and 
Scalabrinian orders, came with the migrants. They introduced services in Italian 
and gained (often with difficulty) the consent of the Australian bishops to 
celebration of saints days which were significant for the migrants (such as the 
Sicilian Festa dei tre santi). Italian priests and services in the Italian language 
became common.
Social clubs have played an extremely important role in maintaining social links 
within the Italian community. Clubs like the Marconi in Western Sydney and the 
Fraternity in Wollongong have grown from small beginnings to enormous buildings 
catering for family entertainment, meals, sports, gambling, weddings, political 
meetings, etc. Their central role in the Italo-Australian community is documented 
by the fact that politicians—including the Prime Minister and the Leader of the 
Opposition—visit them to canvass for votes. The clubs link the generations, 
providing a meeting place for the aged as well as a safe venue for teenage dances 
(Alcorso et a t, 1992: 106-13). Today these clubs also have many non-Italian 
members.
Italo-Australian associations are too numerous to deal with in detail here. In the 
early stages of settlement, mutual aid associations based on villages or regions of 
origin were common. They often developed into more broadly-based social, cultural, 
welfare and educational organisations. Many were concerned with maintenance of 
language and culture, setting up weekend schools for migrants' children. There are 
two competing welfare organisations at the national level: COASIT, which is close 
to the Church and fairly conservative, and FILEF which has a left-wing 
orientation. The rivalry between the two has often been bitter, and has centred not 
only around the question of who can best represent the Italian community, but also 
around obtaining funding from the Australian Government. At present both 
associations are developing programs relating to the needs of the second generation, 
such as youth work and drug counselling (Alcorso et al.f 1992:113-6).
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Another facet of the Italian community is its mass media. La Fiamma appears 
twice a week with a print-run of 28,000. It reports on Italian and Australian affairs 
in Italian, but also has a two-page English language section, in recognition of the 
poor Italian of some of the second generation. II Globo appears weekly with a print- 
run of 35,000. It is similar in character to la Fiamma but lacks an English section. 
Both papers are thought to be close to the Democraziana Cristiana. There are a 
number of monthlies, including the FILEF's Nuovo Paese. Italian is also widely 
used in radio broadcasting, both on the government multicultural stations 2EA and 
3EA and on a number of private transmitters. Italian films and a weekly news- 
bulletin are transmitted on the government multicultural television station, SBS 
(Alcorso et al., 1992: 116-21).
Taking all these practices and institutions together, it seems undeniable that there 
is an Italo-Australian community, and that it is linked to specific forms of Italo- 
Australian culture and identity. None of these can be seen as monolithic, but at 
times they can transcend the divisions of regional origin, class, gender and 
generation mentioned above. Perhaps it is more realistic to speak of a set of 
interlocking networks which coalesce or divide in different ways according to the 
issue. The Italo-Australian community originated partly out of the need for 
solidarity in the face of discrimination and racism in the early period of 
settlement. Today there may be unity on some issues and deep conflicts on others 
(Vasta, 1992).
The growth of the communita has influenced the wider society too. The Italian 
neighbourhoods were at first seen by Anglo-Australians as threatening 'ethnic 
ghettoes'. Today the ambiente has come to be seen as exciting and attractive. The 
original Italian centres of Carlton in Melbourne and Leichhardt in Sydney have 
become highly fashionable, with expensive restaurants and gourmet shops. 
Similarly, the festa has become gentrified. For instance the main Melbourne arts 
events was until recently known as the Spoleto Festival. Italian culture and life­
style is seen as an enrichment of Australian society.
Italian Settlement and Australian Multiculturalism
Together with over one hundred other immigrant groups of varied ethnic and 
cultural background, Italo-Australians have helped to change Australia's culture 
and national identity. This was never envisaged by the architects of the postwar
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immigration program. Policies were designed to bring about social and cultural 
assimilation, so that immigrants would become indistinguishable from Anglo- 
Australians. Politicians and social scientists believed that any special measures for 
migrants would hinder assimilation. It was best to totally immerse the newcomers 
in Australian society. There was public discrimination against people speaking 
other languages, who were told to 'shut up or speak English'. Migrants were to 
work, live and go to school among Australians.
By the 1960s, the basic contradiction of assimilationism was becoming obvious: 
Isfew Australians' were meant to speak English, behave like Australians, and to be 
absorbed into the population. At the same time they were needed as manual 
workers in factories and construction, to replace Anglo-Australians who were 
moving into white-collar jobs. Institutional barriers often kept immigrants in low- 
paid jobs, while welfare services were sometimes inaccessible to immigrants, and 
did not meet their special needs. Not only closeness to the factory, but also 
experience of racism in Anglo-Australian neighbourhoods caused immigrants to 
cluster together. In the inner-city areas, immigrants could create their own 
communities. The reconstitution of the ethnic group in the new country provided 
support networks and a sense of belonging.
Assimilationism was based on the idea that only Anglo-Australian culture was 
legitimate, and that other cultures would have to disappear. It fitted in with 
other racist elements in Australian identity, in particular the oppression of 
Aboriginal people, and the exclusions of Asians through the White Australia 
Policy. But by the 1960s, world-wide decolonisation and anti-racist movements 
were leading to a questioning of Australian racism. In 1967 a referendum decided 
overwhelmingly that Aborigines should be granted full citizenship. Australia's 
international relations were changing too: by 1966, Japan was Australia's biggest 
export customer, and trade with south-east Asia was growing rapidly. The White 
Australia Policy was a serious embarrassment, and was abandoned in the mid 1960s.
The reforms introduced by the 1972-75 Australian Labor Party (ALP) Government 
included non-discriminatory immigration rules and the first enunciation of the 
doctrine of multiculturalism. However, the government was not primarily concerned 
with cultural pluralism but rather with the improvement of welfare and 
educational systems, and their adaptation to a multi-ethnic society. Nonetheless, 
the involvement of spokespersons and organisations of migrant groups did encourage 
the formal constitution of ethnic community organisations, and the growth of an
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ethnic rights movement. The 1975-82 Liberal-Country Party Government retained 
multiculturalism, but redefined it in cultural pluralist terms. Multiculturalism was 
now said to mean that Australian institutions should adapt to the diverse 
composition of the population, while ethnic groups should be allowed to retain 
their languages, traditions and cultural identity, as long as they were loyal to the 
'overarching values' of Australian society. Migrant organisation were given a 
subsidized role in welfare service delivery. Special institutions and services 
included the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs, the Multicultural 
Education Program, the Adult Migrant Education Service and the Special 
Broadcasting Service (SBS) (Castles et ah, 1988: 66-67).
The ALP returned to power in 1983, and the 'Great Immigration Debate' started. 
There were calls for restrictions on immigration and warnings of a threat to identity 
and social cohesion through the 'Asianization of Australia'. Politicians of both 
right and left began to feel that there was widespread opposition to 
multiculturalism. In 1986, the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs was 
abolished, funding for English as a Second Language teaching was cut, and plans 
were made to merge the SBS with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). 
But the cuts led to an ethnic mobilisation which threatened the Labor hold on 
marginal seats in Sydney and Melbourne. Many of the cuts were reversed in 1987. 
The new direction was signalled by the establishment of an Office of Multicultural 
Affairs (OMA), with powers to monitor government policy; the setting up of a 
Prime Minister's Advisory Council on Multicultural Affairs (ACMA) and the 
dropping of the proposed ABC-SBS merger.
Since 1988, the ALP Government has reshaped multiculturalism. It argues that an 
ethnically diverse population is better placed to respond to the challenges of 
increased international trade and communication, and above all to provide the 
opening to Asia which is seen as crucial to Australia's future. The most significant 
statement of the new approach is contained in the National Agenda for a 
Multicultural Australia (OMA, 1989), which identifies 'three dimensions of 
multicultural policy'—cultural identity, social justice and economic efficiency. 
Multiculturalism is not defined in terms of cultural pluralism, but as a system of 
rights of all citizens in a democratic state. These rights, however, are limited by an 
overriding commitment to the nation, a duty to accept the Constitution and the rule 
of law, and the acceptance of basic principles such as tolerance and equality, 
English as the national language and equality of the sexes. The document recognizes 
that some groups are disadvantaged by lack of language proficiency and education,
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as well as by discrimination based on factors such as race, ethnicity, gender or 
culture. It is seen as the role of government to combat such discrimination through 
legislation and institutional structures.
Italo-Australians have played an active role in bringing about the shift from a 
monocultural identity and an assimilationist policy to a multicultural concept of 
Australian society. It was a two-sided process: through their cultural and political 
activities, Italians contributed to the establishment of multiculturalism, which in 
turn became the context for the emerging Italo-Australian community. As the 
largest non-British immigrant group, Italians appeared as the main cultural 
alternative from about 1950 to 1980, offering a distinctive and attractive life-style. 
They refused to be assimilated, constructing their own urban space and challenged 
existing ways of doing things. They showed the benefits of diversity for culture and 
society, and paved the way for the contribution of other ethnic groups (Pascoe, 1992: 
97; Vasta et al., 1992).
The Italo-Australians also developed a political presence, although not with a 
high profile. They have not established their own political parties or trade 
unions, nor have they gained significant representation in parliaments. On the 
other hand, there are a large number of local councillors and some mayors of Italian 
origin. There are no machine politics or ethnic blocks, yet the 'ethnic vote' appears 
to be an issue which influences the behaviour of Australian political leaders. Not 
only do they approach Italian (and other ethnic) associations to mobilise electoral 
support, they also make concessions to ethnic needs and interests in their policies.
The explanation for this combination of a low political profile with fairly 
successful interest articulation seems to lie in the relative openness of the 
Australian political system. Postwar immigrants to Australia encountered a very 
different situation than the large pre-1914 influxes to North America. There, both 
employers and governments followed exclusionary or divisive strategies, with new 
immigrant groups being used as cheap labour and strike breakers. Where they 
resisted, the full force of the state was used against them. In Australia, 
governments and strong unions combined to guarantee orderly industrial relations, 
which would not threaten the conditions of local workers. Policies of assimilation 
may have been discriminatory because they set out to destroy migrants' cultures, but 
by providing civil rights and citizenship, they did lay the ground work for 
political integration. Multiculturalism has given a recognized role to ethnic 
organisations in policy making. This has often led to co-option of ethnic
78 THE CHALLENGE OF MULTICULTURALISM
leaderships, and a process of consultation rather than confrontation in the 
articulation of ethnic interests (Castles et al. 1992: 125-39). However, the fact that 
ethnic groups were allowed to voice their interests does not mean that they have 
obtained a share in real political power. The key positions in the corporate sector, 
the parties, the bureaucracy, the professions, the media and the unions are still 
held by men of British or Irish origin (Jupp, 1984: 182).
Italo-Australians on the Pacific Rim
For the first 150 years of the existence of white Australia, the essential factors 
which structured the world for its inhabitants were dependence on Britain, and a 
strong eurocentrism—that is a belief in the moral, technological and cultural 
superiority of white civilisations based on European ideas. The Australian world 
view thus had two central elements: the first was the 'cultural cringe', the taking- 
for-granted of being an adjunct of a more powerful and capable society. The second 
was the idea that other cultures—and particularly those of Asia—were inferior 
and threatening.
Britain's defeat in the Pacific in 1941-42, and the subsequent crumbling of the 
Empire, shook this world-view, but did not shatter it: Britain could for a while be 
replaced by our 'great and powerful friend', the USA. The real crunch for Australia 
has come since the 1970s. Today, the end of the Cold War, the economic decline of 
the USA, the move towards unification of western Europe, the rise of Northeast 
Asia and the growing significance of transnational capital, are all leading to re­
alignment of political, economic and military structures. The most significant factor 
is the economic ascendancy of Japan and other Asian capitalist countries. It is 
increasingly obvious that Australia needs to change its orientation away from 
Europe and the USA, towards the Asian-Pacific region (Garnaut, 1989).
The Australian economy is indeed shifting its focus. By the end of the 1980s, half of 
foreign trade was with Asian countries. Their hunger for raw materials and, more 
recently, for foodstuffs, fitted well with Australia's desire for manufactured goods. 
On the other hand investment flows between Australia and Asian-Pacific countries 
are still low. In any case, economic openness to Asia is no guarantee of technological 
advancement or improved export performance. Japanese and other Northeast Asian 
countries have already achieved a high level of market penetration in Australia. 
This has been a major factor in the failure of Australia's attempts to achieve a
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strong manufacturing sector. At the same time, these countries maintain high tariffs 
against Australian agricultural products, and use their situation as near-monopoly 
buyers to control the prices of mining commodity exports. Yet Australian production 
has always been highly integrated with the world economy, and any attempt at 
national autarchy would be disastrous. Australia, therefore, appears to be damned 
if it does open up to Asia but also damned if it doesn't.
Increasingly, it is being realised that the only resolution to this dilemma lies in 
cultural change. On the one hand this means the development of a 'productive 
culture' to bring Australian technology and management up to world standards. On 
the other hand it means a cultural opening to allow new forms of communication and 
interaction with the Asian-Pacific region. However, attitudes are still determined 
by generations of cultural distance, ignorance about Asian societies and racist 
contempt for Asian people. The Australian education system virtually ignored Asia 
until the 1980s. Asians were regarded as mysterious and inscrutable; their 
languages were incomprehensible, and their cultures impenetrable. Steps are now 
being taken to remedy this through the teaching of Asian languages and the study 
of Asian social, economic and political institutions.
The basic contradiction of the Australian condition is that a society established as 
an outpost of Britain has been cut off from its antecedents by global change, and is 
now compelled to relate to the Asian-Pacific region which surrounds it. A national 
identity constituted through insularity and racism has to come to terms with the 
all-too-obvious decline of white, European superiority. It might be argued that the 
whole two century episode of British settlement has been an historical aberration, 
an accidental conjuncture of colonialism, which will disappear without trace, as 
Asia develops in the next century. However, British colonialism in the Pacific can 
also be seen as one facet of the process of historical change which started with the 
Italian Renaissance. The expansion of long-distance trade and colonialism brought 
wealth, new commodities, and new ideas to Europe. These provided the basis for 
the emergence of capitalism, industrialisation and modernity, which spread as a 
new global culture throughout Europe, and then to the Americas and Asia. The 
Asian form of industrialisation has a unique dynamic, but it would be unthinkable 
without the preceding emergence of a world capitalist market. British culture in 
Australia may have been narrow and exclusionary, but it was only one sub-set of the 
broad and pervasive culture of modernity.
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It is in this historical perspective that we can see the significance of Italian 
influence. Mass immigration of Italians and other Europeans undermined Anglo- 
Australian narrowness, showing not only that there were other ways of doing 
things, but also that these ways were often more successful, dynamic and rewarding. 
Integration and community-building did not only change the immigrants and their 
cultures; they also influenced Australian institutions, life-styles and world views. 
European settlement made it necessary to shift from assimilationism, based on 
Anglo-Australian cultural dominance, to multiculturalism, which is premised on 
acceptance of cultural diversity.
Today, Australian multiculturalism can provide a workable answer to a question 
which affects many countries: how can a diverse population be incorporated within 
a single nation state? This requires a new definition of national identity, which is 
not based on national or ethnic origins. It is true that multiculturalism is not 
universally accepted in Australia, and that racism re-surfaces regularly in public 
debates on immigration and identity, and in discrimination and hostility against 
minorities. But today racism evokes a response from the organised ethnic 
communities, from a broad section of the public which welcomes cultural diversity, 
and from political leaders who see multiculturalism as vital for Australia's 
political and economic interests.
Thus, we may conclude that the Italians who migrated to the Pacific rim not only 
helped to open Australia to a greater diversity of European cultures. They also 
paved the way for Anglo-Australian awareness of new geo-political realities, and 
in the long run for the opening to Asia. Perhaps this seeming paradox will, in the 
future, be resolved by new forms of international interchange and co-operation, that 
may make it possible to move towards a truly global culture. Mass migration and 
the emergence of multicultural societies can help prepare the ground for this 
development, and history may well judge that the Italians who migrated to 
Australia played a small but significant part.
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CHAPTER 5
GLOBAL WORKFORCE, NEW 
RACISM AND THE 
DECLINING NATION STATE
Introduction
In the closing decade of the 20th century, the world is marked by increasing 
ecological, economic and cultural interdependence. Yet the nation state remains the 
dominant political form. It maintains a near monopoly over the means of violence, 
it is the central focus of most political struggles, and its ideological force is 
demonstrated by the resurgence of nationalism in many areas. The breakup of the 
Soviet Empire has opened the door to a wave of nationalisms based on ethnicity. 
Reunification of Germany and the influx of ethnic Germans appears to confirm the 
idea of a resurgence of nationalism based on the myth of common blood.
Despite these trends, I will argue in this paper that some of the main factors which 
led to the ascent of the nation state in the last two centuries are now diminishing in 
significance. The nation station is beginning to lose its position as the main focus of 
power and political identity. It is not likely to disappear altogether, but rather to 
lose many of its functions, and to become one focus among others of identity and 
political power. The countervailing tendency in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union is the result of uneven development due to a political system which cut the 
region off from the mainstream of economic and political development for half a 
century. It should not blind us to the main tendency in the capitalist world.
The nation state is a form of political organisation which arose from the economic 
and cultural requirements of the period of industrialisation which started in the 
18th century. The nation state provided internal cultural, political and economic 
integration, thus creating the conditions for defending and expanding external 
boundaries. It played a crucial role in the development of the world market and the 
dissemination of the global culture of technology and modernisation. Today, the 
interlocking hierarchies of inequality—mainly along the dimensions of gender,
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class and ethnicity—are still constituted in specific forms within nation states 
(although as general phenomena, of course, they transcend the nation state).
But the very historical success of the nation state has eroded the conditions for its 
continued dominance, and made it a barrier to continued development. The political 
economy of the modern world market relies on increasing international circulation 
not only of capital, resources and commodities, but also of labour (i.e. people). This 
is linked both to cultural homogenisation (in the sense of the pervasiveness of the 
norms of rationality and efficiency) and cultural diversification (in the sense of the 
intermingling of peoples from different backgrounds). In other words, the growing 
economic integration of the world, and the increasing intermingling of national 
cultures encouraged by migration, travel and mass communication, make it hard to 
see why political legitimacy should be exclusively concentrated at the level of the 
nation state. Indeed the growing importance of supranational bodies (like the 
European Community or the World Bank) and the increasing strength of 
regionalism are seriously questioning its dominant role.
This paper is concerned with one aspect of these developments: the effects of mass 
labour migration and the emergence of new ethnic minorities on national identity 
and political legitimacy in advanced industrial countries. The nation state 
typically constitutes its boundaries through processes of inclusion and exclusion 
based on the construction of 'race' or ethnicity. According to Ernest Gellner 
'...nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic 
boundaries should not cut across political ones, and in particular, that ethnic 
boundaries within a given state...should not separate the power-holders from the 
rest' (Gellner, 1983: 1). Nationalism is based on the idea that every ethnic group 
should have its own state, with flag, army, Olympic team and postage stamps. 
Similarly, Benedict Anderson defines the nation as '...an imagined political 
community' (Anderson, 1983: 15). The membership and territory of the sovereign 
nation is limited, and is defined through the belief in 'a deep, horizontal 
comradeship' (Anderson, 1983: 16). But this community is 'imagined' because 
members of a nation can never personally know most of the other members. The 
question is therefore: what causes individuals to feel solidarity with some people 
and not others, or, in other words, how is ethnicity constituted and why is it 
regarded as more meaningful than other forms of solidarity?
The growing ethnic minorities within virtually all developed countries are often 
excluded from the 'imagined community' of the nation, through both informal and
86 THE CHALLENGE OF MULTICULTURALISM
institutional racism. Currently, these processes of exclusion are based on the 'new 
racism': an ideology of the incompatibility of different cultures and the 
inevitability of conflict between distinct ethnic groups. But if groups which belong 
to the economic and social life of a country are excluded from the political sphere, 
this undermines the legitimacy of the state, and questions its relationship with 
civil society. Caught in the contradiction between the desire to maintain 
nationalism as an instrument of political integration, and the problem of managing 
community relations in increasingly diverse societies, states have developed a 
variety of strategies, ranging from permanent exclusion and marginalization of 
minorities (the West German model), to attempts to integrate minorities through 
citizenship and multiculturalism (the Australian model). Before discussing these in 
more detail, it is necessary to describe the development of a global workforce, the 
formation of new ethnic minorities, and the way new racism sets out to stabilise 
national identity.
Labour Migration and the Development of a Global 
Workforce
Labour migration has always played a central role in capitalist development. In 
the early colonial period, forced labour and slavery in Africa, Asia and the 
Americas were a major source of capital accumulation for Western Europe, making 
possible industrial revolutions, which in turn led to recruitment of migrant workers: 
the Irish in Britain, Poles and Italians in Germany and France. In the case of the 
USA, nearly 30 million immigrants, mainly from Europe, entered between 1861 and 
1920, providing the labour for industrialisation. This was followed by the Great 
Migration of blacks to the industrial area from the former slave states of the Deep 
South. Then the Great Depression and a series of restrictive laws kept migration 
from overseas low until 1965. Within Europe, there was little migration between 
1918 and 1939, but the Second World War soon led to new mass population 
movements, while the Nazi War machine ran on forced migrant labour.
Since 1945, there have been two main phases (although the exact forms and periods 
have varied for different countries and regions): the period 1945 to about 1973 was 
characterised by centralisation of productive capacities and recruitment of migrant 
labour in Western Europe and North America. The subsequent period was 
characterised by a trend towards the siting of mass production industry in new 
areas, with concentration of high-technology industry, financial control, design and
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development capacities mainly in the highly-developed countries. Mass labour 
migration has been central to the restructuring of the labour process and 
reconstitution of the working class in developed countries in both phases. In the 
early phase, the emphasis was on recruitment of low-skilled workers for 
manufacturing and construction; in the later phase the migrant labour force has been 
polarised between highly-skilled workers from less-developed countries (the 
'brain drain') and unskilled workers both for manufacturing and the services. At the 
same time, rural-urban migration and overseas emigration has been part of the 
process of incorporation into the world market and industrialisation for newly 
industrialising countries.
Labour migration is a central element of the new forms of global organisation of 
finance, production, distribution and control, which have been emerging in the last 
two decades. Even Japan, which has hitherto relied on internal labour sources, is 
now experiencing an influx of undocumented workers from the Philippines, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and other poorer Asian countries. Migrant women are 
employed as bar-girls and dancers, while men work illegally in construction. In 
early 1990 the Japanese government rejected a legal 'guestworker' program (Sekine, 
1990) and illegal migration looks certain to grow.
In view of growing populations in poor countries and declining birth-rates and 
increasingly aged populations in rich countries, the pressure for labour migration 
continues. Political conflicts are giving rise to increased refugee streams, while 
international and even intercontinental transport is becoming more accessible. At 
the same time, policies designed to contain migratory flows are proving difficult to 
implement, particularly for democratic countries with existing immigrant 
populations (SOPEMI 1990: 2). Thus there can be little doubt that the mass 
population flows of the last half century will be dwarfed by those to come in the 
next fifty years. It is necessary to look at different regions in more detail.
Western Europe
The major period of labour migration to most Western European countries was 1945 
to 1973, followed by a phase of family reunion in the 1970s. Most migrants came 
either through contract labour systems (the so-called 'guestworkers'), or were 
citizens of former colonies (Castles et ah, 1984; Castles, 1986) Immigration was low 
for most countries in the early 1980s, but began increasing again by the end of the 
decade. The largest influx was into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) with 
about 650,000 new entrants in 1988 and nearly a million in 1989, of whom about
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350.000 were from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) (SOPEMI, 1990). Labour 
migration from outside the European Community is increasing again at present. 
Some former emigration countries are now experiencing mass immigration: Italy, 
Greece and Spain all have influxes of undocumented workers from African and 
Asian countries. Since the 1970s there have been streams of refugees from Latin 
America, Africa and Asian countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan, and 
these have accelerated in the last few years.
At present there are 15-20 million people of migrant origin in Western Europe, 
making up between 5 and 15 per cent of the populations of various countries. Britain, 
France and the German Federal Republic all have over 4 million people of migrant 
origin, of whom 40-50 per cent are of non-European background (Castles, 1986, 
SOPEMI, 1990).
The USA
The USA too has become more cosmopolitan through recent migrations. Just as 
European colonialism eventually led to the immigration of colonised peoples to the 
metropoles, now the peoples of the USA's neo-colonial world empire are coming to 
the centre. The Immigration Act of 1965 created a system of worldwide 
immigration, in which the most important criterion for admission was kinship 
with US citizens or residents (Briggs, 1984). In the Reagan era the economic focus 
moved from the heavy industrial and engineering industries of the North and mid- 
West, to the new light industries of the Southern Sunbelt, and the services sectors of 
the great cities, and millions of new jobs were created. The result was a dramatic 
upsurge in immigration, reaching 600,000 legal entrants per year, plus about 100,000 
refugees by the mid-1980s. In addition agribusiness encouraged the entry of up to
300.000 illegal workers per year from Mexico and other Latin-American countries. 
Something like one million new migrants now enter the USA annually.
Forty per cent of population growth in the 1970s came through immigration. By 1980 
there were 13.9 million overseas-born people in the USA—6.2 per cent of the total 
population. In recent years, Latin Americans and Asians have come to dominate 
migrant intakes, leading to a gradual shift in the ethnic composition of the 
population. It is predicted that Hispanics and Asians will soon outnumber Blacks in 
many areas of the USA. Asians are concentrated in certain areas, with Chinatowns 
and Koreatowns in several major cities.
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Oil-Producing Countries
The dramatic increase in oil revenues after 1973 led oil-producing countries to 
embark on ambitious programs of industrialisation. The result was massive 
recruitment of migrant workers. Kuwait, for instance had 384,000 foreign workers by 
1980. In the latter year they made up no less than 78 per cent of the labour force. In 
1980 there were 2.7 million migrant workers in the Gulf oil states (Birks et al.,
1986). The workers came mainly from Arab countries, particularly from Palestine 
and Jordan, but also from Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Philippines. Non-Arab oil 
countries also looked to migrant labour: Venezuela imported large numbers of 
foreign workers in the late 1970s, from both Latin American countries, and Southern 
Europe (Cohen, 1987: 247). Workers streamed into Nigeria from other African 
countries. In both these cases there was little state control or planning. Spontaneous 
flows of undocumented workers fitted well with labour demand.
When the oil boom began to deflate in the early 1980s, some countries adopted 
draconian measures: there were mass expulsions from Nigeria in 1983 and 1985, and 
from Libya in 1985. But in the case of Kuwait, although the inflow declined, an 
increasing proportion of immigrant workers were remaining after the completion of 
their initial contracts (Birks et al. 1986). Despite the strict regulations governing 
the situation of migrants in Gulf states, economic and social factors were leading to 
longer periods of residence. These included continued demand for personnel to run 
the new industries, employers' desire to maintain existing labour forces, and the 
growing employment of domestic servants. However, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq 
in August 1990 has led to a massive exodus of migrant workers, and future patterns 
are hard to predict.
The Newly-Industrialising Countries (NICs)
One reason for the decline in labour migration to Western Europe was the 
development of a 'new international division of labour', in which labour-intensive 
production stages were relocated to Third World countries. The main attraction for 
the foreign companies was the veiy low wages, long hours and lack of social costs in 
these areas. The result was a new wave of migratory movements, both internal and 
international, particularly of women, whom employers regard as most suitable for 
the light assembly work in the new electronics or clothing factories. Employers 
take advantage of patriarchal structures, which make women workers cheaper and 
easier to control.
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The growth of manufacturing in NICs generally does not lead to reduced overseas 
emigration. Rural-urban migration in countries of Latin America and South-East 
Asia is bound up with the capitalist revolution in agriculture. The transformation 
of rainforests into woodchips and of arable land into hamburger ranches liberates 
more peasants than can be absorbed by the new world market factories. So for many 
the exploding cities of Brazil, Mexico, Korea or India are mere staging posts on the 
way to Europe, North America, Australia or the Gulf states.
The Changing Role of Migrant Labour in Developed 
Countries
In the 1970s and 1980s there were major changes in the structure of the world 
capitalist economy, which led to substantial restructuring of finance, industry and 
distribution in the advanced industrial countries. 'Global cities' such as New York, 
Los Angeles, Tokyo, London, Paris, Singapore and Sydney, become centres of 
planning, management and innovation for the transnational corporations (Sassen- 
Koob, 1985). One result is a new polarisation emerging in the labour markets of 
these countries. While demand for highly-trained specialists increases, there are 
also growing numbers of low-skilled jobs in unregulated and non-unionised branches, 
such as catering, the retail trades and light manufacturing. As traditional 
manufacturing declines, the relatively favourable wages and employment 
conditions achieved by generations of blue-collar trade unionists are being eroded. 
Labour market entrants without the required educational credentials, particularly 
migrants, refugees, members of ethnic minorities and women, find they have to take 
low-skilled non-unionised jobs where they have little bargaining power or security 
of employment. The 'global cities' pull in highly-qualified personnel from all over 
the world, but also attract low-skilled migrants to service the needs of the 
corporate elite. These developments have had profound effects on the situation of 
migrant workers.
Firstly, the mass immigration of low-skilled workers has declined considerably. 
Many countries have tried to stop entries, through closing down recruitment 
schemes, or refusing entry and work permits to people without skills. However, 
illegal migrants and refugees continue to provide a source of unskilled labour, and 
this is often tacitly condoned by governments, particularly in the USA and—most 
recently—in Japan. Immigration policies have favoured entry of highly-skilled,
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professional and managerial workers, often leading to a 'brain drain' from the 
Third World.
Secondly, most of the pre-1974 migrant workers have been unable to achieve 
occupational mobility, and remain in unskilled jobs in manufacturing, construction 
and the services. Often their children share this position, as education systems 
have failed to provide them with adequate schooling or vocational training. This 
group has borne much of the brunt of industrial restructuring: lacking skills, 
language proficiency and educational credentials they have been the first to lose 
their jobs, and have high rates of unemployment.
Thirdly, the traditional sites of migrant incorporation into labour markets have 
been eroded. Typically, newcomers used to get unskilled factory or construction jobs 
while they found their feet in the new country, and were able to use these as a base 
for finding better work and establishing social networks. Now most newcomers 
(except those with highly recognised skills) often undergo long periods of 
unemployment, or have to take insecure and often illegal jobs in the services sector. 
This makes initial settlement very difficult, and often leads to long-term poverty 
and isolation.
Fourthly, a new informal sector is developing, in which members of ethnic 
minorities are both marginal entrepreneurs and workers. For example, the revival 
of the garment industry in the highly developed countries, is due to the 
exploitation of migrant women, whose wages have been forced almost as low as 
those of their counterparts in Asia and Latin America (Waldinger 1986, Phizacklea
1987). The services of the great financial centres like New York, Los Angeles, Paris 
and Frankfurt are run by Black, Hispanic, Asian, North African, Turkish and 
Southern European entrepreneurs. Typical migrant workplaces are ethnic 
restaurants, fast-food chains, retailing, garment outwork and sub-contracting in the 
construction area (Castles et al., 1990). Migrant-run small businesses play a major 
role in sectors too small, unprofitable or insecure to interest the large corporations. 
Some groups have found 'ethnic niches' in specific occupations: the Chinese now 
dominate the New York 'rag trade' (replacing the Jewish entrepreneurs and 
workers of an earlier migrant generation), while Koreans play a big part in fruit 
and vegetable distribution (Waldinger, 1986).
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Ethnic Minorities and New Racism
The previous section discussed the increasing significance of labour migration for 
most developed countries since 1945, and the shifts in migratory patterns and forms 
of incorporation of migrant labour in recent years. Migrations of various types look 
set to continue, so that an increasingly international labour force will be a feature of 
Western Europe, North America, Australia and Japan for the foreseeable future. 
This obviously means increasing ethnic diversity in the populations of these 
countries. It is important to understand that, although migrant labour forces are 
heterogeneous with regard to areas of origin and skill levels, certain sections of the 
immigrant population have taken on an ethnic minority position in each receiving 
country.
Ethnic minority status is not a matter of numbers, but rather of processes of social 
exclusion, which constitute distinct groups with inferior legal rights and/or socio­
economic status. Not all immigrants belong to ethnic minorities. Although no 
generalisation is true of all cases, it may be said that, on the whole, immigrants 
with high occupational status, from relatively developed countries, and with a 
similar cultural and ethnic background are not likely to be treated as ethnic 
minorities. On the other hand, immigrants with low skill levels, from less 
developed countries, and with distinct cultural and ethnic background are likely to 
become ethnic minorities. Nor do all ethnic minorities consist of recent migrants: 
aboriginal peoples in the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Scandinavia 
are all victims of processes of social exclusion and marginalization. The USA has 
long established black and hispanic minorities. Most European countries also have 
'old' ethnic minorities, created by conflicts within the historical process of nation 
building. And finally, Gypsies still have ethnic minority status throughout Europe. 
However, we shall not deal with these old minorities here.
Rather, what we are concerned with here is the process of constitution of new ethnic 
minorities as a result of the post-1945 migrations, the causes of the process, the 
mechanisms by which this takes place, the effects on society as a whole, and the 
consequences for the relationship between civil society and nation state. My 
argument is that exclusionary policies and practices towards the new ethnic 
minorities arise from attempts to control migrant labour and to preserve the 
(assumed and desired) cultural and ideological integrity of the nation states 
concerned, but that these objectives cannot be achieved in the long run, once the 
internationalisation of the labour force and population has become irreversible.
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Ethnic minorities are constituted through processes whereby dominant groups 
ascribe (real or imagined) characteristics to the group concerned, and use these to 
justify exclusion from equal participation in the legal, political, economic, social 
and cultural arrangements of society. These processes may be seen as racism, both 
institutional and informal. Institutional racism means the development by a 
dominant group of structures (such as laws, policies or administrative practices) 
which exclude or discriminate against the dominated group. Informal racism is 
when members of a phenotypically or culturally demarcated group express 
prejudice or carry out discriminatory practices against members of another such 
group in an unorganised manner.1
Racist practices, whether institutional or informal, are based on racist beliefs 
(which may be held consciously or unconsciously). 'Scientific racism' which 
developed in the 19th century, put forward biological theories of inherent and 
immutable differences between human groups, classified according to real or 
imagined physical differences. It was argued that differences in intelligence, 
character, behaviour and ability could be related to these assumed phenotypes, 
and that these differences inevitably led to hierarchical relationships between 
the groups concerned (Miles, 1989). Such theories were used to justify European 
imperialism and the exploitation of colonised peoples, as well as 'Nordic 
superiority' and anti-semitism within Europe. This type of racism may be defined 
as the belief that certain groups are intrinsically superior to others, and are 
therefore entitled to dominate or exclude them. This belief is far from dead, 
playing a major part in the ideologies of extreme-right groups, as well as in popular 
culture. Nonetheless, it has been discredited, both by revulsion against the extreme 
violence of Nazi racism, and by the ending of direct colonial domination. Moreover, 
most natural and social scientists reject the validity of the concept of 'race' in 
classifying human groups (Montagu, 1974).
The main ideology used to justify exclusionary practices against minorities in 
developed countries today is a set of beliefs which have come to be called 'new 
racism' (Barker, 1981). This is a discourse on 'natural difference', generally based on 
the pseudoscience of sociobiology. The theory claims not to be racist, because it is 
not based on ideas of racial hierarchy, and generally does not use the term 'race', 
preferring 'tribe' (Morris, 1971) or 'ethnic group' (Van den Berghe, 1981). Balibar
1 It should be noted that the self-definition of cultural and social identity by members of 
an ethnic minority is also relevant in this context. This will be discussed below, in the 
section on the reconsitutions of culture and identity by ethnic minorities.
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speaks of 'racisme sans race' (Balibar, 1988: 36). New racism asserts that all human 
groups are in principle equal, yet their cultures are different and incompatible, and 
each must therefore remain on its own territory. In most variants, these cultural 
differences are seen as immutable, since they are based either on 'human nature' or 
on long historical processes. Where groups share the same territory through 
migration, conflict is likely, and can only be prevented by excluding the interlopers 
from equal participation in society, for instance by denying citizenship. The power 
of this ideology lies in the way it provides an explanation of immigration and 
formation of ethnic minorities that fits in with commonsense notions of natural 
difference and the threat of outsiders. It presents a pseudoscientific justification for 
exclusion and discrimination, while not appearing to be racist in the traditional 
sense.
Immigration, Citizenship and Nation: a Comparison of 
Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany
The construction of ethnic minorities must be considered in relation to four sets of 
factors:
— economic and social factors which lead to relative segregation, 
hierarchy, competition and conflict in areas of immigration;
— legal and institutional arrangements;
— attitudes and behaviour towards minorities;
— the reconstitution of culture and identity by minority groups within the 
process of migration and settlement.
Rather than attempting to present a general model of the interaction of these 
factors, I will describe them briefly in the case of two countries with widely 
differing policies towards immigrants and minorities: Australia and the FRG. They 
are also countries with very different traditions of nation-state formation and 
citizenship. The two countries may be seen as extreme cases; any similarities we 
find between them are likely to be of relevance for other countries too.
Economic and Social Factors in the Formation of Ethnic Minorities 
Both Australia and the FRG had mass, organised labour migration from the 
Mediterranean region in the postwar period, Australia from 1947 until the early 
1970s, the FRG from 1956 to 1973. Both countries recruited low-skilled workers to 
support the expansion of their manufacturing and construction sectors. Primary
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migration was followed by family settlement. In both cases, new migratory flows, 
often of refugees, developed in the late 1970s, with migrants coming from a wide 
range of non-European countries.
Currently Australia has an immigrant population of around 3 million—about 20 per 
cent of the total population. Another 3 million are children of immigrants—the so- 
called second generation. However, over two fifths of immigrants are from Britain 
or New Zealand, and cannot be considered to have ethnic minority status. There are 
over 80 different ethnic groups, the largest being the Italians, Greeks, Germans, 
Lebanese and Vietnamese. The FRG has a foreign population of 4.5 million—7.5 per 
cent of the total population. One third of them are Turks; the other large groups are 
mainly from Southern Europe.
Lack of education and training, together with various types of institutional and 
informal discrimination restricted migrant workers' job opportunities. They became 
heavily concentrated in factory work and building, though there was a subsequent 
shift into the services sector. There has been relatively little upward social 
mobility of the original migrant workers, so that labour forces show marked 
segmentation by area of origin and gender. Certain types of work—such as car 
assembly—are done predominantly by migrant men, while others—such as garment 
manufacturing and food processing—are done predominantly by migrant women. 
The availability of migrant labour forces has made upward mobility easier for a 
section of the local labour forces.
In both countries, concentration in certain types of work was one factor leading to 
concentration in certain types of housing and residential areas: generally low 
quality housing in city centre or industrial areas. Other factors were institutional 
and informal racism in allocation of housing, and the desire of migrants to live near 
their compatriots. In both Australia and Germany there are identifiable areas of 
migrant concentration. Here the infrastructure for ethnic communities can develop. 
On the other hand, the indigenous population develops a perception of distinct— 
and perhaps threatening—ethnic enclaves.
Thus, apart from the relative size of the ethnic minorities, there are considerable 
similarities between the two countries in the economic and social situation.
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Institutional and Legal Arrangements Towards Ethnic 
Minorities
However, when we look at the character of the nation-states and the way in which 
immigrants have been incorporated, we find major differences. Australia is a new 
nation, settled by British colonists in the 18th and 19th centuries. The relatively 
small Aboriginal population was killed or pushed aside and excluded from the 
emerging nation. Australia became a sovereign state in 1901, though still closely 
linked to Britain. Until the Second World War most settlers were from Britain, 
although there were some Irish and other Europeans. Identity was based on British 
culture and traditions, and on being part of the Empire, although distinctively 
Australian features began to emerge in the early part of the 20th century.
From 1901 until the 1970s, the White Australia Policy shaped entry to the nation in 
explicitly racist terms. In 1947 a mass immigration policy was introduced, to 
increase population for strategic reason and to provide labour for industrial growth. 
The aim was to bring in predominantly British migrants, but not enough were 
available. When it proved necessary to bring in Eastern and Southern Europeans, 
policies were designed to bring about complete political and cultural assimilation. 
State policy towards migrants was inclusionary: they were treated as 'New 
Australians', and encouraged to settle as families and become Australian citizens. 
Naturalisation was granted after five years (later reduced to three and then to two 
years), and migrants formally had full rights in every social sphere.
Nonetheless there were (and remain today) a number of institutional barriers 
which prevent migrants from fully participating in society, and lead to economic 
and social disadvantage. Indeed it can be argued that labour market policies which 
lead to ethnic segmentation directly contradict the ideology of assimilation. 
Moreover assimilation itself is a racist policy, in that it labels immigrants' cultures 
as inferior, and tries to obliterate them. As will be discussed later in this paper, 
assimilationism was abandoned in the mid 1970s in favour of the a policy of 
cultural pluralism called multiculturalism.
However, it is significant that Australian citizenship is inclusionary. It is based on 
/us soli, that is on territoriality rather than ethnicity, and is designed to make 
people from varied backgrounds part of the 'imagined community'. In other words 
membership of the civil society is a membership ticket to the nation. The state, 
through immigration policy, can decide who is to become part of the civil society,
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and then, through the mechanism of naturalisation, make them into part of the 
people.
Germany, on the other hand, is an historical nation, with roots which go back many 
centuries, although attempts to define the nation in cultural terms did not become 
significant until the 18th century, and the demand for a German national state did 
not become significant until the 19th century (Hoffmann, 1990: 74). When the 
German Reich emerged as the first real German state in 1871, it was far from 
including on its territory everybody considered German. Indeed no German state has 
ever done this, although the Reich put this forward as an aim, just as the later 
Bundesrepublik claimed to represent all Germans, even those who had never 
stepped on its soil. German nationality was defined not through territoriality, but 
through ethnicity, that is through language and culture. Essentially, a person could 
only obtain German nationality by being born into the German community, so that 
'blood' became a label for ethnicity, and the ethnic group became the Volk.
German citizenship, then is based on ius sanguinis, and the nation-state is a 
Volkstaat. Anyone who can claim German ethnicity (or 'blood') is entitled to 
citizenship. When Hitler annexed Austria in 1938, he could claim that its citizens 
were going 'home to the Reich', though they had never belonged to it. Similarly 
Germans from the GDR, Poland, the Soviet Union, etc. can receive a passport the 
moment they arrive in the FRG. But nobody who is not born German can become it. 
The Nazis took away the citizenship of Jews and Gypsies whose ancestors had 
lived in Germany for centuries, because they allegedly lacked German 'blood'. 
Today, immigrants who have worked and lived for 20 years in the FRG are denied 
naturalisation, and their children, born in the FRG, can never be German, because 
they have the wrong 'blood'. Some exceptions are made: in 1987 37,810 persons were 
granted German citizenship, at which rate it would take 125 years before the 
whole foreign population became German (SOPEMI, 1990:187).
German citizenship is thus based on exclusion, and is fundamentally racist, defining 
the 'imagined community' on the basis of culture or 'blood'. Millions of foreign 
workers have been recruited for the economy. They have settled and become part of 
civil society, but they are excluded from the nation, and from incorporation in the 
state. This is the political rationale behind the seemingly absurd slogan 'the FRG 
is not a country of immigration'. Foreigners can become members of the civil society, 
but not of nation and state (see Hoffmann, 1990). It is obvious that this model cannot 
be stable, as will be discussed further below.
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Attitudes and Behaviour Towards Minorities
When we turn to popular attitudes towards immigrants, we again find marked 
similarities between Australia and Germany. Both countries have traditions of 
racism which have their roots in 19th centuries ideas of 'Nordic' racial superiority. 
Popular culture, as reflected in the mass media and in 'commonsense' knowledge, is 
replete with racist stereotypes. Both countries have a history of racism towards 
members of certain European ethnic groups. For instance, anti-semitism was strong in 
both countries up to 1945, and has still not disappeared altogether. Past treatment 
of labour migrants (such as the Irish and Southern Europeans in Australia, Poles 
and Italians in Germany) was discriminatory and exploitative. Attitudes and 
behaviour towards non-Europeans goes back to genocide against Aborigines and 
exclusion of Chinese and other non-Europeans through the White Australia Policy 
in the case of Australia. German colonialism, marked by brutal treatment of black 
people in South West Africa and other territories, has left widespread prejudice 
against non-Europeans.
Postwar Southern European labour migrants to both Australia and the FRG 
encountered considerable hostility and discrimination. In the last 15 years or so, 
both countries have had less European immigrants, and an increase in entries from 
other parts of the world: the Middle East, South-East Asian and Latin America, in 
the case of Australia; Turkey, North Africa and other parts of Africa and Asia in 
the case of the FRG. It appears that 'otherness' is now primarily constructed around 
non-European origin. In addition Islam is taken as a special marker of difference 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1989; Goot, 1988). Racial attacks, public 
statements, discrimination and the activities of extreme-right groups all 
concentrate on non-European minorities. In Australia and the FRG (and indeed in 
most other developed countries) the incidence and virulence of racism is on the 
increase. There are powerful political forces calling for the stopping of 
immigration, the reduction of minority rights and even mass deportation.
Increased racism has relatively little to do with the characteristics of the 
minorities themselves. Rather it is linked to the economic and social crisis arising 
through economic restructuring and rapid social change. In particular the working 
classes of countries like Australia and Germany have suffered severe and sudden 
changes in their conditions of work and life in the last two decades: new 
technology, deskilling, decline in blue-collar employment, urban crisis and declines 
in the welfare services. These changes have occurred at a time when immigrants, 
particularly of non-European origin, have become increasingly visible in the cities.
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They appear as competitors for jobs, housing and social amenities, and as a threat 
to security and life-styles.
Neo-conservative theories of difference and conflict provide an ideological 
justification for such 'commonsense' interpretations of ethnic competition and 
conflict. These in turn provide the basis for state strategies of crisis management 
based on exclusion and control of minorities. In this area the difference between the 
FRG and Australia is that the discourse of exclusion has prevailed in the former, 
while in the latter it has not. The reasons for this lie partly in the different ways 
in which the nation-state is constituted in the two countries, as discussed above, 
and partly in the problems of managing community relations in a country with very 
large minorities, as will be argued below.
The Reconstitution of Culture and Identity by Ethnic Minorities 
In the process of migration and settlement, migrant groups create their own social 
networks. These provide support and social contact in a strange and sometimes 
hostile environment. They are often based on chain migration and some degree of 
residential proximity. Typically, these networks provide a form of community 
(within the wider society), marked by language and cultural maintenance, 
development of educational, cultural and political organisations, and emergence of 
an ethnic petit-bourgeoisie. Ethnic communities find a source of identity in 
homeland culture, though this is applied in uneven and contradictory ways, and 
often considerably modified in the new situation. This process is very complex, and 
varies considerably in character in different immigration countries and for different 
groups. A detailed discussion is not possible here.
The existence of ethnic communities is in part a reaction to informal racism: where 
settlers encounter discrimination and exclusion, they group together for physical 
and psychological protection. This in turn may appear to local people as a 
threatening enclave or ghetto, thus confirming racist fears of 'swamping'. Equally, 
institutional racism and labour market segmentation cause residential clustering, by 
forcing minorities into a common low status position. Nonetheless, maintenance and 
adaptation of migrant cultures and the development of communities in the cities is 
a major force of social change and renewal. In both Australia and the FRG this type 
of community formation has taken place, and in both cases has led to a discourse on 
enclaves and Uberfremdung. The difference is that Australian policies of granting 
full rights and citizenship to immigrants grants greater legitimacy to the cultural 
and political expression of minorities. Often this is articulated through the
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development of minority petit-bourgeoisie's, which act both as forces of social 
control and as sources of economic and cultural innovation. In the FRG, in contrast, 
exclusionary policies deny legitimacy to such developments.
The point to be emphasised is that ethnicity does not arise because of ''primordial 
sentiments' or the desire to maintain a separate identity within the country of 
immigration. Since most migration is part of a transition from rural to industrial, it 
must be assumed that most migrants are open to cultural and social change. Rather 
ethnicity is part of a process of dynamic interaction, in which migrant groups use 
the cultural resources available to them to cope with a particular situation within 
the migratory process. Exclusionary policies by the receiving society will encourage 
a trend towards traditionalism and separatism (and even fundamentalism). Denial 
of cultural pluralism by racist structures and practices thus actually creates 
pluralist demands from the minorities. In contrast, where receiving societies create 
structures which permit equality of opportunity and civil rights to settlers, 
separatism is unlikely, and migrant cultures will survive in a form of creative 
interaction with the majority culture.
Whether the majority accepts the cultural rights of minority groups or not, their 
survival affects the character of the nation state. Members of migrant minorities 
inevitably have multiple identities, based—in varying contexts—on aspects of 
homeland cultures and receiving country cultures, and on a synthesis of both. If the 
minorities are excluded from the nation (as in the FRG), that very exclusion 
questions the legitimacy of the state, while the denial of rights leads to conflicts 
within civil society. An exclusionary nation-state must, in the long run be a 
repressive and racist one. If, on the other hand, cultural pluralism is accepted, then 
the whole society has to recognise a multiplicity of identities. This may undermine 
a national identity based on ethnicity, and cause a redefinition of the boundaries of 
the nation.
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Multiculturalism and the Nation
The comparison of immigration and minority formation in Australia and the FRG 
has shown both similarities and differences. The similarities include:
— Large-scale immigration and settlement since 1945, with increasing 
numbers of non-European migrants in recent years;
Institutional and informal practices which concentrate certain groups of 
migrants in manual employment, leading to marked segmentation of the 
labour market according to ethnicity and gender;
— Residential concentration in urban areas, affected by housing problems 
and poor infrastructure, where competition and conflict with local 
people, especially members of the working class, develop;
— The growing significance of racist discourses, based mainly on 'new 
racism', which use the presence of minorities as an explanation of 
economic and social problems, and advocate exclusion and discrimination.
The differences include:
— Larger relative size of the immigrant population in Australia;
— An inclusionary concept of the nation in Australia, where access to the 
civil society leads to inclusion in nation and state, compared with an 
exclusionary, racist form of the nation in the FRG;
— An immigration policy based on permanent settlement and citizenship in 
Australia, compared with a policy based on temporary residence in the 
FRG.
With regard to the similarities, both countries are fairly typical of the situation in 
most developed countries. With regard to the differences, they represent opposite 
poles on a continuum, where most other countries are somewhere in-between. In view 
of the likely continuation (and even expansion) of migration to developed countries, 
it is my hypothesis that the German model of temporary migration and exclusion 
from the nation cannot be maintained in the long run, because it negates a central 
principle upon which the legitimacy of the contemporary liberal state is based: 
that it should appear to incorporate all significant sections of civil society, and 
take account of their interests. By excluding a large and growing section of civil 
society, the German model creates the conditions for separatism and conflict. The 
only way of managing the real ethnic diversity of society while maintaining an 
exclusionary form of nation and citizenship is by raising the new racist discourse on 
difference to an official ideology. Certainly, there are strong forces, especially
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within the CDU-CSU, which are trying to do just that, as the new Auslandergesetz 
shows. However they can only postpone the inevitable shift to a more inclusionary 
model, and in doing so cause a great deal of conflict and hardship. They cannot 
prevent the shift in the long run. The needs of administration and community 
relations have already led to the emergence of multicultural policies in some areas 
in education, welfare and local government. Such policies are eventually likely to 
extend to areas of central government such as immigration policy, labour market 
rights, welfare entitlement and citizenship.
It is therefore important to look in more detail at the development of policies for 
managing diversity within Australia, and to realise that multiculturalism is not 
without its contradictions and problems (the following account is based on Castles 
et al. 1988). As already mentioned, assimilation was seen as the basic principle for 
dealing with immigrants in the early postwar period. Access to citizenship, 
together with assimilationist educational and social policies were designed to 
make them 'New Australians'—indistinguishable from Anglo-Australians by the 
second generation. Assimilation was thus an attempt to preserve Anglo-Australian 
ethnicity as a principle for defining the nation, through cultural absorption. It 
failed because labour market segmentation, residential concentration and the 
maintenance of migrant cultures combined to produce continued ethnic pluralism. By 
the late 1960s the explicitly racist construction of identity through assimilationism 
and the White Australia Policy had to be abandoned.
The Australian Labor Party Government (ALP) from 1972-75 emphasised migrant 
rights and cultural diversity as a principle for making the welfare system more 
open to disadvantaged groups. However it was the Liberal-Country Party 
Government of the late 1970s that really made multiculturalism a principle of 
social policy. This was done within the framework of a neo-conservative agenda 
devoted to cutting government expenditure, and privatising welfare. Ethnicity, 
defined in primordialist terms, was made the principle for welfare delivery and 
social control. By recognising the ethnic group, as represented by traditionalist, 
male, petit-bourgeois leaders, the conservative government could avoid confronting 
issues of class, gender and racism. Multiculturalism in this period was thus an 
ideology of cultural pluralism, with no consequences for the central economic and 
political structures of society.
In the period of ALP Government since 1983, multiculturalism has been redefined in 
a process of public debate and conflict, in which the main contenders have been:
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— Federal and state bureaucracies concerned both with economic efficiency 
and social control;
— Ethnic minorities, with a variety of conflicting interests and needs;
— A labour movement concerned with potential threats to conditions both 
through immigration and a divided labour force;
— Progressive intellectuals who advocate a cosmopolitan and open concept 
of the nation;
— New racist intellectuals, who have tried to mobilise public opinion 
around an exclusionary concept of national identity.
The concept of multiculturalism which has become predominant in policy-making 
since about 1987 is one which accepts cultural pluralism as a long-term feature of 
society, but no longer sees this as a central policy-focus. Rather the central issue is 
seen as one of full equality of rights and opportunities for all citizens, whatever 
their ethnic background. The National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, an 
official policy document launched by the Prime Minister in July 1989, names three 
dimensions of multicultural policy (OMA, 1989):
— Cultural identity: the right of all Australians, within carefully defined 
limits, to express and share their individual cultural heritage, including 
their language and religion;
— Social justice: the right of all Australians to equality of treatment and 
opportunity, and the removal of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture, 
religion, language, gender or place of birth;
— Economic efficiency: the need to maintain, develop and utilise 
effectively the skills and talents of all Australians, regardless of 
background.
This program is notable for its inclusionary rhetoric: it speaks not of minorities but 
of 'all Australians'. It reiterates the rights of all citizens in a liberal society, and 
then goes on to recognise the existence of structural barriers which have to be 
removed to achieve these. The third dimension is a justification of the first two in 
terms of an ideology of modernisation. It is a statement of faith in the integrative 
power of the capitalist economy and the liberal state. But the program is based on 
recognition that lack of language proficiency and education, together with still- 
existing mechanisms of marginalization require special measures to improve the 
situation of minorities. The measures announced in the National Agenda are 
predominantly concerned with increasing equality of educational and occupational 
opportunities, rather than with cultural pluralism. They fit in with a whole gamut
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of special institutions and services introduced in the last few years to increase 
equality of opportunity and make government services accessible to people of all 
ethnic backgrounds. Laws on equal opportunity in employment, and against racial 
vilification and incitement are also part of the process of removing barriers.
Nobody would claim that racism has been overcome in Australia, nor that 
inequalities of ethnicity and gender have been removed. It is also significant that 
the issue of class is not mentioned at all in the National Agenda, although 
inequality of income distribution, and the number of very poor and very rich 
Australians are currently increasing. However, it is important that 
multiculturalism has now been defined as a necessary aspect of the constitution of 
the liberal state, and that it is conceptualised in terms of economic, social and 
political rights. It seems to be that this principle is significant for all states which 
have experienced mass immigration, and that the best way of countering racism is 
firstly to fight for the introduction of this principle, and secondly to work to give it 
real social content—something which is still necessary in Australia too.
Conclusion
Migrants inevitably have multiple identities. These last for generations and lead 
to links with countries of origin as well as country of residence. But then, most 
people have multiple identities which relate to family, peer groups, hometown, 
voluntary groups and so on—for migrants the issue of plural national identity is 
added. However, this leads to a dilemma, which is already very visible in the 
Australian case: if the nation can no longer be defined by ethnicity, because the 
civil society is made up of many groups, nor by exclusion, because the nation-state 
needs to incorporate all significant groups, what is its basis? If we add to this that 
the economy is increasingly international, and that culture and language no longer 
function as sufficient national markers, then the problem is obvious. If being 
Australian is only defined through possession of certain economic, social and 
political rights, then how is it different from being a citizen of any other liberal 
democratic state?
Some people have suggested that the answer is a return to territoriality, which 
was the principle for defining political status prior to the bourgeois revolutions. A 
person was automatically the subject of a certain monarch, through simply being on 
the soil of his or her territory. A modem version would be that as soon as a migrant
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was allowed to enter a country, he or she would be a citizen with all rights and 
duties. This is an attractive option in many ways, but it effectively abolishes the 
nation-state based on ethnicity. It would presumably mean the end of nationalism, 
because who would be willing to die for a state which was held together only by 
the legal status of a citizenship which could be readily exchanged for another one?
This would not be a reason for despondence. The only tangible function left to the 
nation-state in this age of population movements and internationalisation of 
economy and culture is a political one: the nation-state can to a limited extent 
develop national ideologies and loyalties; it can control the means of violence; it 
can manage social conflicts. The state can also provide the systems of social 
security, education and training needed to reproduce the working population. The 
nation state thus survives because it is still the most effective agency for managing 
civil society and for social control. But this function is not one that most people on 
the left would want to defend.
However, the nation-state is not on the verge of extinction. I would suggest that its 
political and ideological basis has become shaky in countries with large and 
diverse immigrant populations like Australia, although even here there are strong 
racist and nationalist sentiments. It also appears to me that similar problems for 
the definition of the nation-state will develop in other countries like the FRG, 
France and Britain, as it becomes obvious that ethnic diversity can only be 
effectively managed by making immigrants not only members of civil society but 
also full participants in the nation. I suggest that this will give further impetus to 
the development of new forms of social identification and political legitimacy, 
which will erode the still-dominant role of the nation-state.
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